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1 Introduction 
The German social insurance system has a very long tradition, the national health insurance, 
the first pillar of the social insurance system was introduced in 1883.The social insurance 
system was subsequently amended by a statutory accident insurance (1884), a statutory 
pension system (1889) and unemployment insurance (1927). When the Federal Republic of 
Germany was founded in 1949, its constitution explicitly stated that Germany was a welfare 
state under the rule of law (Articles 20m and 28). This welfare state principle, however, did 
not define the specific institutions of the welfare state. The task of defining the institutional 
rules of the welfare state was left subsequent to the governments. The institutional design of 
the welfare state and its reforms is consequently the topic of on-going political debate. 
This paper focuses on two elements of the welfare state: the public pension scheme and 
unemployment insurance. The public pension scheme in Germany is organized as a 
Bismarckian Pay-As-You-Go system (PAYG). Current employees pay the pensions of current 
retirees. In contrast to a funded pension scheme, employees do not accumulate capital in a 
PAYG system. The same is true of unemployment insurance. Socially insured employees 
have to pay contributions. The contributions are used to finance payments to those currently 
unemployed. The level of unemployment benefit is subject to changes as political preferences 
vary over time. 
The social insurance system is financed by taxes and duties, which induce economic welfare 
losses [e.g. Kay (1980)] and may reduce competitiveness in a globalized economy [e.g. 
Janeba (1995)]. Political decision-makers also have to consider the negative effects of the 
social welfare state. Moreover, the fiscal burden of a PAYG pension system critically hinges 
on the dependency ratio. A shrinking labour force and the increasing number of recipients of 
social transfers resulted in the need to adjust the social security systems in Germany [e.g. 
Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1998)]. After years of a wait-and-see strategy [keyword “Die 
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Rente ist sicher”], political decision-makers realized the problems of demographic change and 
the challenges of global competitiveness. As a result, both the public pension scheme and 
unemployment insurance were reformed at the beginning of this century. These changes in 
both social security systems were the most dramatic since the founding of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1949. 
The public pension scheme was modified in several ways. The sustainability factor was 
introduced into the benefit formula of the pension system. The Riester-Reform subsequently 
promoted private pension schemes
1
 [see Börsch-Supan et al. (2003) for details]; and, finally, 
the retirement age was increased [see Ehrentraut and Heidler (2008)]. These reforms may help 
to stabilize the public pension system by decreasing expenditure and increasing revenues. 
Current studies indicate that the pension level will decrease in the future [German Council of 
Economic Experts (2007)] and that expenditure will decrease as a result compared to a 
scenario without these reforms [Bucher-Koenen and Wilke (2008)]. 
The changes in unemployment insurance introduced with the so called Hartz-Reforms (these 
changes came into effect between 2003 and 2007) were the most substantial since the 
implementation of unemployment insurance. The long-term unemployment benefit, formerly 
a wage-dependent benefit, was reduced to a wage-independent subsistence level. Moreover, 
the time limit for receiving short-term unemployment benefit was reduced significantly. The 
Hartz-Reforms aimed to create incentives to work and to increase the competitiveness of the 
German economy [Burda and Hunt (2011)]. Today both objectives, namely stabilising social 
security financing and increasing the competitiveness of the German labour market, are 
considered to have been achieved [German Council of Economic Experts (2008), German 
Council of Economic Experts (2007)]. 
                                                          
1
 These private pensions are subsidized. The provisions made via private pension schemes decreases the value of 
the public pension. 
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The reforms of the German public pension scheme and unemployment insurance affected the 
situation of individuals and prompted them to change their behaviour. This raises several 
research questions. Was the risk of old-age poverty increased due to the reforms? To what 
extent does skill level, gender or marital status affect the risk of old-age poverty? Have the 
Hartz-Reforms affected wage setting, and therefore the competitiveness of the German 
economy? Do households adapt their saving behaviour due to their expectations, and have the 
Hartz-Reforms affected this saving behaviour? These issues are examined in detail below. 
After analysing the risk of old-age poverty in Germany (sections two and three), we examine 
the impact of the Hartz-Reforms on individual wages in section four. Our analysis concludes 
with an examination of the impact of individual (income and unemployment) expectation on 
the saving behaviour of households in section five. 
 
1.1 Summary 
In sections 2 and 3, we analyse changes in old-age income risk in Germany due to changes in 
employment patterns and institutional reforms. We find that the risk of old-age poverty will 
increase for almost all new pensioners in 2020-2022 compared to new pensioners in 2004-
2006. These analyses discuss differences in the incidence of old-age poverty by sex, skill and 
marital status. We focus on the statutory pension scheme because it is currently the most 
important source of income for retirees in Germany. In 2007, statutory pensions accounted for 
over 90% of old-age income in Eastern Germany and about 80% in Western Germany [see 
Heien et al. (2007)]. 
In the German PAYG system, the pension claim is proportional to the socially insured life-
cycle labour income; therefore the higher the overall individual labour income, the higher the 
individual pension. Due to increasing disruptions in employment biographies since the 1970s, 
mass unemployment in Eastern Germany since the 1990s, and the structural reforms of the 
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German social security system, there is a growing fear of post-retirement poverty in Germany. 
Our analyses help to answer the question of whether this fear is justified or not. The 
increasing disruptions in employment biographies and mass unemployment in Eastern 
Germany decrease pension claims due to missing years in employment. Moreover, the recent 
structural reforms of the German social security system lower the monthly pension claim in 
three different ways. Firstly, the pension claim for the long-term unemployed is decreased 
significantly. Secondly, pensions are explicitly linked to demographic developments and the 
share of private pension schemes. The higher the share of pensioners relative to socially 
insured workers, the lower the individual pension. Thirdly, in order to reduce the cost of 
social security, statutory pension claims are lowered. 
Section 2 presents a micro-simulation model to compare the distribution of statutory pension 
claims for new retirees in 2020-2022 and the claims of new retirees in 2004-2006. The 
pension claim distribution is calculated separately for Eastern and Western Germany, for men 
and women, and for low, medium and high skilled persons. Throughout Germany, growing 
post-retirement poverty can be observed, especially among low-skilled workers. The share of 
affected low skilled males dramatically increases in Eastern Germany from 4% to 53% 
(Western Germany: 28% to 45%). Moreover, Eastern Germany will lose its current low 
inequality in terms of pension income distribution and its higher public pension level 
compared to Western Germany. More specifically, the mean pension claim of males will 
decrease by about 16% in Eastern Germany, whereas it will stay constant in Western 
Germany. 
In section 3, the micro-simulation is modified to analyse the most common types of household 
with respect to marital status, and the analysis focuses on households instead of individuals. 
As in section two, education is the key to a sufficient statutory pension in both parts of 
Germany. In general, the probability of old-age poverty increases for all types of households 
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between 2004-2006 and 2020-2022. Nevertheless, specific groups like, for example, widows 
or couples where both individuals are high skilled are much less affected. Our findings help to 
clarify the risk of post-retirement poverty for specific household constellations. The overall 
old-age poverty risk of two-person households is significantly lower than for a single person 
household. 
What are the political implications of the increasing old-age poverty risk in Germany? First of 
all, both society and political decision-makers should be aware of growing old-age poverty in 
the future and must find ways of protecting themselves against the old-age poverty risk. Due 
to the characteristics of a PAYG pension system, political decision-makers have to improve 
labour market participation, especially among low skilled workers and (Western German) 
women in order to avoid post-retirement poverty. Advanced training is a long-term instrument 
to increase the skill level of workers and to improve their employment outlook. Nevertheless, 
additional instruments are needed and become more important in the future to avoid old-age 
poverty in the short and medium term, e.g., a minimum pension. Moreover, employees have 
to complement their statutory pensions with private as well as occupational pension schemes.
2
 
Nevertheless, employees with a small labour income and/or long periods of unemployment 
are unlikely to offset their old-age poverty risk via private pension plans. 
Section 4 takes a closer look at the impact of the Hartz-Reforms on wages. Theory predicts 
that the level of unemployment benefits affects the wage [e.g. Rogerson et al. (2005)]. A 
decreasing unemployment benefit should have a lowering effect on wages. Using the Hartz-
Reform as a quasi natural experiment, we analyse this linkage. For most workers the reform 
meant a decrease in both their long-term and their short-term unemployment benefit. We use 
panel data to estimate the effect of the structural break on wages and find strong evidence that 
                                                          
2
 Coppola (2008) provides evidence for an increasing number of people with private or occupational pension 
plans between 2003 and 2007. 
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the decrease in unemployment benefit lowered wages. After the reform, the wages for men 
decreased c. p. by up to 2%. For women the decrease was even slightly higher. Moreover, the 
lowering effect of a lower unemployment benefit increases with the skill level. 
Our findings show that the Hartz-Reform induced wage restraint and may also be partly 
responsible for the favourable labour market situation in Germany [German Council of 
Economic Experts (2011)]. The Hartz-Reform also increases the flexibility of the German 
labour market. Moderate wage setting and labour market deregulation improved the situation 
for capital investments and increased the competitiveness of the economy [see Spector 
(2004)]. Thus, the labour market situation improved and employment increased [e.g Sinn et 
al. (2009), Klinger and Rothe (2012), Krause and Uhlig (2011)]. 
After analysing the effect of institutional reforms on old-age income (sections 2 and 3) and 
wage (section 4), we examine the impact of unemployment and income expectations on the 
savings behaviour of households in section 5. Individuals may adapt their savings behaviour 
to the expected probability of becoming unemployed. A higher probability of unemployment 
decreases expected future income. Hence, when facing a lower expected income, individuals 
raise their savings in order to smooth their intertemporal consumption path. We examine 
whether households adjust their savings behaviour to a change in their individual 
unemployment, income and health expectations. In contrast to former studies, which often use 
proxies instead of individual expectations [e.g. Skinner (1988)], we use household based 
expectations. To this end, we use survey panel data on German household savings and 
expectations, the SAVE Panel. The findings suggest, in contrast to the theory of textbook 
models, that a higher unemployment expectation significantly decreases the (short-term) 
saving rate. 
This result may be due to labour market legislation after the Hartz-Reforms, as private assets 
reduce long-term unemployment benefit. Unemployed persons have to liquidate 
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assets/savings (down to a given level) before they can apply for long-term unemployment 
benefits, they may adjust their savings when they expect to become unemployed.
3
 We are not 
able to identify a significant relationship between general future income expectations and 
savings, but we show that both unemployment and health expectations affect the savings 
decision. Moreover, we find that good health expectations weaken the impact of the 
unemployment expectation. Thus, exogenous shocks in the labour market may affect the 
savings rates, and therefore the capital markets and investments. As a result, social security 
systems can avoid contagion effects.
4
 
 
1.2 Contribution to the literature 
Sections 2, 3 and 4 are based on articles written in co-authorship. “A Fragile Pillar: Statutory 
Pensions and the Risk of Old-age Poverty in Germany” (section 2) was published in 2010 in 
FinanzArchiv 4 (66). The co-author is Wolfgang Nagl, a PhD student at the Dresden branch 
of the ifo Institute. His contribution to the paper consists of the literature and legislation 
review, as well as the calculation of the (skill specific) pension point distributions for males. 
My contribution to the paper is the selection of appropriate datasets, the preparation of the 
data for the analysis and the calculation of the (skill specific) pension point distributions for 
females. The analysis is based on the IAB employment panel by the German Federal 
Employment Agency, as well as the VSKT 2005 (Versichertenkontenstichprobe 2005) by the 
Research Data Centre of the German Pension Insurance. The revisions of the paper taking into 
account the referees’ suggestions were made by both authors. 
                                                          
3
 This linkage has to be examined by further research in detail. 
4
 The same is true for a health care system, which may reduce uncertainty about the future health situation. 
Studies show that “the introduction of social health insurance can substantially reduce uncertainty about out-of-
pocket health expenditure, and thus reduce” savings when a health insurance became available [Chou et al. 
(2003) p 1 892]. 
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Section 3 builds on the article “Is There a Growing Risk of Old-age Poverty in Eastern 
Germany?”, which was published in 2009 in Applied Economics Quarterly Supplement 55 
(60). The calculations of household pension point distributions in this paper are based on the 
pension point distributions of individuals, as used in section 2. My co-authors are Wolfgang 
Nagl and Prof. Dr. Joachim Ragnitz, Dresden branch of the ifo Institute. Prof. Dr. Joachim 
Ragnitz suggested the research question, supervised the working process and revised the 
paper. Wolfgang Nagl surveyed the literature and summarized the legislation. He also 
calculated of the pension point distributions for single-person households. As in section 2, my 
contribution to the paper is the selection and preparation of the data sets. Moreover, I 
calculated representative skill specific household pension point distributions using 
information from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany about partnerships of elderly 
persons. Later on I used the two-person household pension point distributions to calculate the 
pension point distributions for widows. The revisions of the paper taking into account the 
referees’ suggestions were made by W. Nagl and myself. 
Section 4 presents the article “Unemployment Benefits and Wages: Evidence from the 
German Hartz-Reform” which is due to be published in the Journal of Economics and 
Statistics (Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik). This article was written by 
Wolfgang Nagl and myself. W. Nagl’s contribution to the research consists of the selection 
and preparation of the data, as well as the general regression analysis. My contribution to the 
paper consists of the literature and legislation review, as well as the sensitivity analysis of our 
findings. Revisions of the paper taking into account the referees’ suggestions were made by 
both authors. I amended and modified all published papers by adding more detailed 
descriptions (e.g. of the methodology) and by performing a language check.  
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2 A Fragile Pillar: Statutory Pensions and the Risk of 
Old-age Poverty in Germany
1
 
by Stefan Arent and Wolfgang Nagl 
2.1 Introduction 
Many developed countries are facing a significant demographic change with a growing old-
age dependency ratio. The ongoing aging process of many European societies raises the 
question of whether old-age incomes are secure. The OECD recently compared the situation 
of today’s pensioners in its member states and found that ‘old-age income poverty is common 
to most OECD countries’ [OECD (2009, p.74)]. A shrinking labor force will have to support a 
growing number of pensioners, which is likely to result in an increasing risk of old-age 
poverty. The social reality of a shrinking labor force, which will have to support a growing 
number of pensioners, is likely to result in an increasing risk of old-age poverty. In Germany, 
the old-age dependency ratio will rise from 34 % in 2009 to 55 % in 2040 [Federal Statistical 
Office Germany (2009)].
2
 Given the German Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) pension system, this 
situation will lead to lower pension levels and higher social security contributions. A 
significant body of research has examined old-age poverty risk. Most of the literature 
concentrates on average values and standard pensioners, but little is known about the entire 
distribution of pension incomes. 
In addition to the challenges posed by demographic change, high unemployment is a problem 
[especially in Eastern Germany, see Berlemann & Thum (2005)] that also contributes to old-
age poverty. Through disruptions in employment biographies, unemployment causes people 
to accumulate less entitlement in the statutory pension insurance. Unemployment also creates 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is published as "A Fragile Pillar: Statutory Pensions and the Risk of Old-Age Poverty in 
Germany" in FinanzArchiv 4 (66), 2010, 419-441. 
2
 The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of people older than 65 in 2009 and older than 67 in 2040 to the 
working population (20 - 65 in 2009 and 20 - 67 in 2040). 
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difficulties in saving for old age. Finally, the pension reforms, which have been instituted 
since the early 1990s, may have further increased the risk of old-age poverty. 
These facts are well known, however the extent of the growth of old-age poverty risk is 
largely unknown. Focusing on the German statutory pension insurance, we calculate the 
distributions of benefits for people retiring in the years from 2020 to 2022 compared with 
those retiring in the years from 2004 to 2006. Distinct from the related literature, we 
disaggregate benefit distributions with respect to gender, vocational education level and place 
of residence (Eastern or Western Germany). In contrast to the Deutsche Rentenversicherung 
(2007) or OECD (2009), we focus on the distribution of pension points and illustrate the 
pension outlook across three skill levels. We also use a much larger dataset, and we generate 
more detailed statistical information about the distribution of pension claims with respect to 
gender, region and skill level.
3
 Statutory pension should be a good approximation for the total 
old-age income for two reasons. First, for the vast majority of people, the benefit from 
statutory pension insurance is the most important component of old-age income.
4
 Second, the 
lower an individual’s income, the higher the ratio of statutory pension to his entire old-age 
income.
5
 
The statutory pension will remain the most important source of old-age income for the next 
decades. Börsch-Supan et. al. (2008) state that, in 2040, the statutory pension will amount to 
70% of the average old-age income. Moreover, there is no reliable data on occupational and 
private pensions. 
                                                          
3
 Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2007) is based on individual interviews and official data. The sample contains 
about 13,000 individuals from four age groups composed of 20 birth cohorts (1942 - 1961). Our dataset contains 
information from more than 100,000 individuals from two age groups composed of six birth cohorts (1939 - 
1941 and 1955 - 1957). 
4
 Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2007) estimates that today statutory pensions account for over 90% of 
old-age income in Eastern Germany and about 80% in Western Germany. 
5
 BMAS (2008) provides evidence that statutory pensions are the dominant source of old-age income for low-
income earners. 
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Our analysis starts with a brief introduction to German statutory pension insurance in section 
2.2. In section 2.3, we describe our approach and our dataset. The simulation results are 
presented in section 2.4. We discuss the results in section 2.5 with respect to critical 
assumptions and demographic facts. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2 The German Statutory Pension Insurance 
The German statutory pension insurance is a Bismarckian PAYGO system.
6
 The monthly 
pension (𝑀𝑃) is determined by four factors, as described in the following equation: 
𝑀𝑃 =  𝑇𝐹 ∗  𝑃𝐹 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝑉 ∗  𝐸𝑃.    (1.1) 
The first factor on the right hand side is the Time Factor (𝑇𝐹), which is equal to one when a 
person retires at the legally determined age. Currently, the retirement age is 65 years and will 
increase to 67 by 2029. In the case of early retirement, the 𝑇𝐹 is reduced by 0.03% per month. 
Early retirement is feasible up to 60 months before the seniority set by law, so the maximum 
deduction is 18%. If a person decides to work beyond his legally determined age of 
retirement, the 𝑇𝐹 is increased by 0.05% per month. In the following analysis, we assume a 
𝑇𝐹 equal to one. We do so for two reasons. Firstly we are interested in the ability of the 
German pension system to prevent old-age poverty and not in the effect of changes in early 
retirement. Secondly keeping the current average value of 𝑇𝐹 constant would just have level 
effects. Nevertheless we are aware of the early retirement issue and its impact on old-age 
poverty, and we discuss this problem in section 5. 
The Pension Factor (𝑃𝐹) determines the monthly pension according to pension type. For the 
standard old-age pension, the pension factor is equal to one. It deviates from one for other 
                                                          
6
 A good introduction to the determinants and calculation methods in the German statutory pension system is 
provided by Breyer and Buchholz (2009). 
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pension types, such as a surviving dependent’s pension or a disability pension. As we focus 
on old-age pensions, we assume 𝑃𝐹 to be equal to one. Individual earning points (𝐸𝑃) are 
calculated for each period 𝑡 as a ratio of the annual gross salary of individual 𝑗 (𝐼𝐴𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡) and 
the mean annual gross salary (𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡) in region 𝑖.
7
 To obtain an individual’s total 𝐸𝑃, the 
𝐸𝑃s for all working years are summed up. 
𝐸𝑃 = ∑
𝐼𝐴𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝐴𝐺𝑆𝑖𝑡
, 𝑖 = 𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑛𝑡=1 .     (1.2) 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the mean wages in both parts of Germany. Wages in both 
parts of Germany grew continuously but the gap between Eastern and Western Germany did 
not decrease since the end of the 1990s. The upper limit is about 2.14 𝐸𝑃 in every period t.8 
This limit is reached at 64.800 € in Western Germany and 54.600 € in Eastern Germany in 
2009. Individuals also receive 𝐸𝑃s while being unemployed. For short-term unemployment, 
𝐸𝑃s are calculated based on 80% of the most recent gross income. Long-term unemployed 
receive approximately 0.1 𝐸𝑃 for one year of long-term unemployment. 
                                                          
7
 The individual incomes in Eastern Germany are also compared to the mean annual gross salary in Western 
Germany but are multiplied by a factor to compensate for the lower wage level in Eastern Germany. 
8
 This upper limit is almost fixed because the assessment ceiling is adjusted every year in correspondence to the 
annual growth of the mean incomes. Deviations only occur because of one year lagged adjustments of the 
assessment ceiling. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Annual Average Gross Salaries 
Source: authors’ calculation 
The Earning Point Value (𝐸𝑃𝑉) translates the 𝐸𝑃s into monetary values. The 𝐸𝑃𝑉 is 
calculated every year for Western and Eastern Germany separately, as long as there are 
differences in income between Western and Eastern Germany. The 𝐸𝑃𝑉 is determined 
through a demographic factor, the growth rate of wages and the contribution rate of the 
statutory pension insurance.
9
 The evolution of the 𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑊 and 𝐸𝑃𝑉𝐸 are presented in Figure 2. 
In 2009, the 𝐸𝑃𝑉s were 27.20 € in Western Germany (𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑊) and 24.13 € in Eastern 
Germany (𝐸𝑃𝑉𝐸). In the following analysis, we keep the 𝐸𝑃𝑉s constant to facilitate the 
comparison of pensions across cohorts. Note that variations in the 𝐸𝑃𝑉 would have level 
                                                          
9
 The growth rate of the 𝐸𝑃𝑉 in Eastern Germany (𝐸𝑃𝑉𝐸) must be at least as large as the growth rate of the EPV 
in Western Germany (𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑊). This restriction is due to the intended adjustment from the 𝐸𝑃𝑉𝐸  to 𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑊. Besides 
this adjustment restriction, a positive growth restriction is also set by law. The growth rate of the 𝐸𝑃𝑉s must be 
strictly non-negative. 
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effects, but would not affect the distribution. We discuss the impact of variations in the 𝐸𝑃𝑉 
on old-age poverty in section 5.
10
 
Figure 2: Evolution of 𝑬𝑷𝑽𝑾 and 𝑬𝑷𝑽𝑬 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
2.3 Methodology 
Our aim is to compare the distributions of accrued 𝐸𝑃s in the German statutory pension 
insurance for two cohorts. We consider new pensioners in the years 2004 to 2006 and new 
pensioners in 2020 to 2022. For simplicity, we assume that all people receive old-age 
pensions and retire at their legally determined age of retirement.
11
 As mentioned above, we 
keep the 𝐸𝑃𝑉 constant. 
                                                          
10
 In addition to the basic calculation methods presented here, there are many specific rules that enter the 
calculation of pensions for certain groups. One of the most important groups is employees in the mining 
industry. For this group, there are three main differences. First the pensionable age for miners is 60, rising to 62 
by 2024. Second, it is possible for miners to gain more than 2.14 𝐸𝑃s a year. Third, the 𝑃𝐹 is 1.33. 
11
 We account for the gradual increase of the seniority set by law to 67 until 2029. 
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To obtain a more detailed picture, we classify people according to their education, 
distinguishing between three skill levels. A person without vocational training, is classified as 
low skilled. A completed vocational training is regarded as a medium skill level, and an 
academic degree is the criterion for a classification as high skilled. In addition, we carry out 
separate analyses for men and women as well as for Eastern and Western Germany. 
The dataset, which allows us to reconstruct individual working careers and to distinguish 
between age, gender, qualification and residence, is the IAB employment sample 1975-2004 - 
regional file (IABS-R04) from the German Institute for Labor Market and Job Research 
(IAB). This dataset contains a two percent sample of all workers registered in the German 
social insurance system.
12
 To our knowledge, we provide the first analysis using the IABS - 
R04 to calculate individual monthly pensions. Table 1 and Table 2 show the distribution of 
skill levels for Western and Eastern Germany, respectively. Whereas the fraction of high 
skilled men and women in the old cohort is significantly larger in Eastern Germany, there are 
more high skilled men but fewer high skilled women in Western Germany in the young 
cohort. 
Table 1: Skill Eastern Germany 
 1939-1941 1955-1957 
Qualification Male Female Male Female 
Low 3.1% 7.1% 1.7% 2.5% 
Medium 77.2% 79.3% 83.3% 80.7% 
High 15.7% 10.1% 12.8% 14.3% 
Not Known 4.0% 3.6% 2.0% 2.5% 
Total Quantity 3335 4128 5163 5396 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
                                                          
12
 Drews (2008) gives a detailed description of this dataset. 
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Table 2: Skill Western Germany 
 1939-1941 1955-1957 
Qualification Male Female Male Female 
Low 15.8% 26.3% 8.0% 11.9% 
Medium 74.3% 67.2% 74.7% 75.8% 
High 7.5% 3.3% 16.3% 10.6% 
Not Known 2.4% 3.2% 1.0% 1.7% 
Total Quantity 18639 13903 27525 25271 
Source: authors’ calculation 
All information in the IABS - R04 is given as spell data. Every spell contains information 
about individual incomes on a daily basis. In addition to working biographies, spells of 
unemployment are also included. The IABS - R04 provides information from 1975 to 2004 
for Western Germany and from 1992 to 2004 for Eastern Germany. 
Because of the spell structure of the dataset, we have to review and edit the dataset to 
determine an individual’s annual income. We specifically concentrate on individual income 
and education. To review skill levels we convert the spell structure of the dataset into a panel 
structure. As a first step, we transform the original spell information for every individual into 
annual information.
13
 We then calculate in a second step individual annual income. Because 
of the missing income information in cases of unemployment, we calculate the individual 
unemployment benefit as well as the unemployment aid with respect to the applicable 
regulation. After completing the individual income information, we calculate the EPs for 
every person in the sample. 
To achieve reliable results, we eliminate some entries from our dataset. First, a person must 
be registered for a minimum of five years in the IABS-R04. This five year period is necessary 
because people with less than five years are likely generating their pension rights in other 
                                                          
13
 The length of a spell is determined by the length of the individual status signal and not by a standardized time 
frame (e.g., annual base). 
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systems.
14
 For example, civil servants in Germany are secured by a separate pension system. 
The self-employed are another group that is outside of the statutory pension insurance system. 
Note that some civil servants and self-employed may be included in the sample if they were 
insured in the statutory pension insurance for more than 5 years. Finally we neglect mortality 
so we condition the analysis on individuals reaching the retirement age. 
As the IABS - R04 dataset only contains information for the period of 1975 – 2004 and 1992 - 
2004 for Western Germany and Eastern Germany, respectively, we have to make plausible 
assumptions about the employment history and the future employment career until the 
retirement age. The first gap to fill is the time up to 1975 and 1992, respectively. For example, 
a person from Western Germany born in 1939 was 36 years old in 1975. If this person started 
working at the age of 20, 16 years of working time (1959 - 1975) are missing in the IABS-
R04. We solve this problem by using a second dataset [SUF FDZ-Biografiedatensatz - VSKT 
2005 Source: FDZ-RV (VSKT 2005)] with similar information to complete the missing time 
periods. This dataset is a 0.2% sample of all workers registered in the German social 
insurance system between the age of 15 and 67.
15
 
To combine both datasets we first divide the VSKT 2005 into 24 sub-groups according to 
education (high, medium, low), age (cohort 1939 - 1941 and 1955 - 1957), residence (Eastern 
and Western Germany) and gender (male and female). Second we sum the individual’s 𝐸𝑃s 
until 1975 (Western Germany) and 1992 (Eastern Germany). Finally, we examine the 
empirical distribution of all 24 sub-groups. Table 3 provides a summary of the characteristics 
of the 24 distributions. To combine the IABS-R04 with the VSKT 2005, we have to enlarge 
the VSKT-2005 data using a bootstrap technique. In a last step, we combine the two datasets. 
                                                          
14
 Another reason for the 5 year restriction is that the German statutory pension insurance only pays out pensions 
after 5 years of contributions. 
15
 A detailed description of the VSKT 2005 can be found in Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2008) and Stegmann 
(2009). 
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Every person in the IABS-R04 receives a random 𝐸𝑃 drawn from the 𝐸𝑃 distribution given 
for his individual characteristics (skill, cohort, residence, gender).
16
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the 24 VSKT 2005 Sub-groups 
   Western Germany Eastern Germany 
   Male Female Male Female 
1939 -1941  High  Mean  12.01 7.39 40.97 31.76 
std.  5.16 5.72 4.72 7.04 
Medium  Mean  15.48 8.01 38.29 24.27 
std.  5.00 4.58 6.36 7.26 
Low  Mean  13.88 6.63 34.47 11.66 
std.  6.93 4.70 7.94 4.05 
1955 -1957  High  Mean  0.23 0.10 14.57 12.73 
std.  0.53 0.33 5.24 3.09 
Medium  Mean  0.71 0.64 15.15 12.41 
std.  0.69 0.66 3.38 2.68 
Low  Mean  1.23 1.23 12.82 11.66 
std.  0.97 0.97 4.57 4.05 
Source: authors’ calculation 
The second gap to fill is the time until retirement in 2020 - 2022 for the young cohort 
(forecast period). Figure 3 illustrates the methodological approach for the oldest and youngest 
age-groups in Western Germany. We assume that every individual maintains his/her 
unemployment characteristics observed so far until he/she retires. We calculate the fraction of 
employment, short-term unemployment and long-term unemployment relative to the total 
time in the IABS-R04 sample (base period) and apply these fractions to the time until the 
individual reaches the age of retirement.
17
 To calculate the 𝐸𝑃 in the forecast period, we use 
the current labor market legislation with respect to unemployment spells. An alternate 
                                                          
16
 We also calculated this simulation period with average values. We calculated the average 𝐸𝑃 per year worked 
for all 24 groups according to gender, education, region and year of birth. Both methods lead to almost identical 
average results. Since the empirical distribution method shows more realistic variations, we focus on this method 
in the following analysis. 
17
 We classify a person as short-term unemployed when he/she receives unemployment benefits and as long-term 
unemployed when he/she receives unemployment aid. 
2 A Fragile Pillar: Statutory Pensions and the Risk of Old-age Poverty in Germany 
 
21 
 
scenario is calculated with the assumption that the Eastern German employment pattern 
converges to the Western German. The resulting differences are negligible. 
 
Figure 3: Methodical Approach Using the Example of Western Germany 
 
Source: authors’ calculation 
We calculate the 𝐸𝑃 distributions for the two cohorts (1939 - 1941 and 1955 - 1957) at their 
retirement age with respect to individual characteristics and the current law.
18
 In the following 
analysis, we concentrate on the differences between the two cohorts of new pensioners. In a 
first step, we test whether the 𝐸𝑃s of the different cohorts follow the same statistical 
                                                          
18
 We consider the increase of the retirement age until 2020 respectively 2022. 
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distribution using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test (K-S-Test) [Massey (1951)].
19
 In a second 
step, we compare the relevant statistical characteristics of the EP distributions, in particular 
the median and mean of the cohorts. We use the Mann-Whitney-U-Test (M-W-U-Test) and 
Mood’s median test (M-M-Test) [Siegel (1957)].
20
 If there is a variation over time, the tests 
identify differences in the mean and median of both cohorts. 
 
2.4 Results 
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of the two cohorts regarding their financial 
situation in the statutory pension system. There is a widely held belief that Germany will face 
old-age poverty in the near future. Therefore, we ask whether there is a growing risk of old-
age poverty and whether there are specific differences between the two parts of Germany. We 
also discuss the importance of the individual skill level and the differences between men and 
women. 
 
2.4.1 Male pensioners 
Figure 4 displays the 𝐸𝑃 distribution of men in Western Germany on the left-hand side and 
men in Eastern Germany on the right-hand side. The dark bars represent the accrued 𝐸𝑃s of 
the 1939 to 1941 cohorts, and the light bars show the outcome for the younger cohorts. To 
assess the risk of old-age poverty, we assume a threshold of 25 𝐸𝑃s (Marked by vertical lines in 
the diagrams). In 2008, 25 𝐸𝑃s are equivalent to a monthly pension of 583.50 € in Eastern 
Germany and 664 € in Western Germany. We use this level as a critical threshold because it is 
                                                          
19
 The K-S-Test identifies if two i.i.d. samples are part of the same population. In the case of different 
populations, i.e. different distribution functions, the test should reject the hypothesis of an identical distribution. 
A p-value of zero implies different population distributions. 
20
 The Mann-Whitney-U-Test is also a statistical test for assessing whether two i.i.d. samples come from the 
same population. The Mann-Whitney-U-Test allows further statements. The test identifies different means and 
medians. Mood’s median test is used to confirm the results of the Mann-Whitney-U-Test. 
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nearly equivalent to the level of social assistance. In 2008 the means-tested benefit of needy 
persons over the age of 65 in Germany was 638 € [Federal Statistical Office Germany 
(2010)]. Our own calculations using federal data yields means-tested benefits of 614 € in 
Eastern Germany and 644 € in Western Germany. For simplicity we choose 25 𝐸𝑃 as a proxy 
for both parts of Germany. We interpret our results focusing on two main issues: first, the 
comparison over time and second, the comparison of the two regions. In Eastern Germany, we 
observe a statistically significant decrease of the mean pension level and the distribution 
becomes more heterogeneous over time. Heterogeneity also increases in Western Germany. 
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Figure 4: Earning Point Distribution of Male Pensioners 
  
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Western 39 -41 Western 55 -57 Eastern 39 -41 Eastern 55 - 57 
25% percentile 29.05 19.47 40.10 27.71 
50% percentile 39.27 39.97 45.20 37.11 
75% percentile 48.33 56.85 51.02 46.59 
Mean 38.81 39.47 45.42 38.48 
Std. Dev. 12.97 22.48 7.41 14.25 
Skewness  -0.04 0.13 0.05 0.68 
Kurosis 2.44 1.91 2.59 3.23 
< 25 EP 16.18% 32.34% 0.12% 18.31% 
 p-Value p-Value 
KS -Test 0.000 0.000 
MW-U-Test 0.399 0.000 
Median-Test 0.004 0.000 
Source: authors’ calculation 
For both regions, the KS-Test shows evidence for different distributions for the two cohorts 
(p-value is zero). The mean and median change over time in Eastern Germany whereas in 
Western Germany there is no statistically significant variation.
21
 The older cohort in Eastern 
Germany profits from the long, continuous employment in the former German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) and from the strong revaluation of the incomes of those times. Since the 
1970s, workers in Western Germany have faced a growing risk of unemployment, which has 
led to a lower mean 𝐸𝑃 level. It is also important to keep in mind that, there are also 
                                                          
21
 A p-value close to zero indicates two different distributions. A p-value of the M-W-U-Test close to zero 
indicates different distributions with different means and medians. A p-value close to zero of the M-M-test 
indicates different medians. 
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individuals in the sample who are now self-employed or civil servants, but who acquired 𝐸𝑃s 
for more than five years. 
For the age-group born in 1955 to 1957 in Eastern Germany, the period since the reunification 
is more important. A lower level of income for unskilled work in connection with increased 
unemployment leads to a significant increase in the share of people below the critical 
threshold. In Western Germany (16.2% to 32.3%) as well as in Eastern Germany (0.1% to 
18.3%) we observe an increasing risk over time. There is no clear evidence for a change of the 
median and mean in Western Germany, but the distribution becomes broader. The slight 
increase in the mean/median 𝐸𝑃 may be somewhat puzzling with respect to the longer 
unemployment spells. Two developments may explain our finding. First, over the past three 
decades, the wage inequality has increased in Western Germany [Dustmann et. al. (2009)]. An 
increase in the wage inequality translates directly into a broader 𝐸𝑃-distribution. Second, the 
upper limit of 𝐸𝑃 increased up to 2003 and, since then, has remained almost constant.22 This 
made it possible for people with high incomes to get more 𝐸𝑃. 
In both parts of Germany, the standard deviation increases from the older to the younger 
cohort. The risk of old-age poverty rises in Eastern and Western Germany. This increase is 
especially striking in Eastern Germany, but the risk is still below the risk in Western 
Germany. 
 
2.4.2 Female pensioners 
In Western Germany, the situation of women is quite different from that of men, while in 
Eastern Germany it is quite similar. Apart from this finding, we detect two specific features 
                                                          
22
 The maximum EP was 1.62 in the 1960s, 1.59 in 1970s, 1.80 in the 1980s and 2.07 in the 1990s. Since 2003, 
the level has remained nearly constant at 2.14 EP. Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2010) provides an overview of 
the historical data of the assessment ceiling and the average gross incomes. 
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for women. First, women collect lower average 𝐸𝑃s than men throughout all skill classes, and 
second, women in Western Germany collect lower average 𝐸𝑃s than women in Eastern 
Germany. Figure 5 displays the 𝐸𝑃 distributions for females in both parts of Germany. 
Figure 5: Earning Point Distribution of Female Pensioners 
  
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Western 39 -41 Western 55 -57 Eastern 39 -41 Eastern 55 - 57 
25% percentile 13.46 9.98 24.46 22.03 
50% percentile 19.57 18.99 29.90 30.09 
75% percentile 27.02 32.25 36.86 43.50 
Mean 20.99 22.94 30.62 33.36 
Std. Dev. 10.17 16.30 8.89 14.39 
Skewness  0.70 1.03 0.13 0.69 
Kurosis 3.29 3.67 2.97 2.76 
< 25 EP 69.39% 62.85% 27.32% 34.93% 
 p-Value p-Value 
KS -Test 0.000 0.000 
MW-U-Test 0.016 0.000 
Median-Test 0.000 0.605 
Source: authors’ calculation 
A comparison of Figure 4 and Figure 5 shows the similarity of the 𝐸𝑃 distributions of Eastern 
German men and women as well as the dissimilarity of the 𝐸𝑃 distributions of Western 
German men and women. In Eastern Germany, the 𝐸𝑃 distributions for women and men have 
similar characteristics with respect to skewness, kurtosis and the standard deviation. The main 
reason for the different patterns of the 𝐸𝑃 distributions for women in Eastern and Western 
Germany and the relative lower 𝐸𝑃 level in Western Germany is the much lower full-time 
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labor market participation of women in Western Germany [BMFSFJ (2005)]. Nonetheless the 
employment rates are nearly equal because of the high part-time employment of women in 
Western Germany and the poor labor market conditions in Eastern Germany [Grundig 
(2008)]. As a result, the 𝐸𝑃 level in Western Germany is more than ten 𝐸𝑃s below the Eastern 
German level (20 𝐸𝑃 vs. 30 𝐸𝑃). The distributions in both parts of Germany become broader 
over time. For Western Germany we found evidence for an increasing full-time labor force 
participation of the medium- and high-skilled women.
23
 Medium- and high-skilled women in 
Eastern Germany benefit from increasing incomes after reunification. Whereas the low skilled 
(and part of the medium skilled) women suffer from the poor labor market conditions. The 
statistical tests show different distribution patterns of old and young women in both parts of 
Germany. Only the median in Eastern Germany shows no variation. 
 
2.4.3 Relevance of skill 
This section explores the impact of education on the expected pension claims of men and 
women. Our results show that pension levels increase and poverty risk decreases with 
education. This finding holds true for men and women and also for Eastern and Western 
Germany. Table 4 reports the summary statistics for the different skill levels with respect to 
gender and cohort. In Table 4, the higher 𝐸𝑃 levels of high-skilled men (51.05 𝐸𝑃 and 50.03 
𝐸𝑃) and women (41.71 𝐸𝑃 and 43.68 𝐸𝑃) in Eastern Germany for both cohorts are especially 
noticeable. For men, the higher share of high-skilled employees with relatively high incomes 
within the statutory pension system raises the mean 𝐸𝑃 level and thereby increases the gap 
between the medium- and high-skilled in comparison to Western Germany. In Eastern 
Germany, there are more high-skilled people in the statutory pension system because they 
could not switch into alternate pension systems before 1990 (civil servants or self-
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 Dustman et. al. (2009) also finds evidence for increased female wage inequality. 
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employment). Furthermore, the substantially higher mean 𝐸𝑃 levels of women in Eastern 
Germany are explained by their higher labor market participation and their higher affinity to 
full-time employment. 
Table 4: Comparison of Mean EP Level by Skill 
 Mean EP Male Mean EP Female 
 Skill Level  1939-1941 1955-1957 1939-1941 1955-1957 
Western Germany 
 High  42.29 47.48 24.20 27.99 
 Medium  39.84 38.70 21.98 23.06 
 Low  32.32 30.44 18.06 17.65 
Eastern Germany 
 High  51.05 50.03 41.71 43.68 
 Medium  44.53 36.93 29.82 31.83 
 Low  39.11 27.86 23.85 23.86 
Source: authors’ calculation 
The old-age poverty risk decreases with education. This becomes very clear when comparing 
the situations of low- and high-skilled men.
24
 Figure 6 shows the 𝐸𝑃 distribution of high-
skilled men in Eastern and Western Germany whereas Figure 7 shows the 𝐸𝑃 distribution of 
low-skilled men in Eastern and Western Germany. The simulation for Eastern Germany 
demonstrates clearly that old-age poverty risk will increasingly depend on the skill level. 
Here, the percentage for high-skilled men with 25 or less 𝐸𝑃s rises from zero to 10.3%, and 
the percentage for low-skilled men rises from 3.9% to 53.4%. The 50 percentage point 
increase is dramatic and may appear unrealistic at first sight. However, the results reflect the 
poor labor market opportunities for people without vocational training in Eastern Germany. 
The unemployment rate is above 40% [Reinberg & Hummel (2007)] and the wages of the 
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 Further details for all skill levels and for both sexes are given in den Appendix. 
2 A Fragile Pillar: Statutory Pensions and the Risk of Old-age Poverty in Germany 
 
29 
 
low-skilled people in employment are low. Fortunately the number of low skilled people in 
Eastern Germany is relatively low (1.7% in our sample).
25
 
Figure 6 shows an old-age poverty risk for the high-skilled men of 10.29% for the young 
cohort in Eastern Germany. For the old and young cohorts in Western Germany the risk of 
old-age poverty is 16.09% and 27.96% respectively. For high-skilled men, the old-age 
poverty risk of the young cohort in Eastern Germany and for both cohorts in Western 
Germany is overestimated. This overestimation is due to the fact that there are individuals 
with low 𝐸𝑃s within the sample who have left the statutory pension system because they 
became civil servants or are self-employed. Most of these people are secured by alternate 
pension schemes. Note that the increasing standard deviation is not an artefact of the 
bootstrapping method. Using an alternative simulation, we also calculate average values for 
the simulation period. Thereby we get, especially for the young cohort, nearly the same 
standard deviations. 
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 In Western Germany, the poverty risk for low-skilled workers is also significantly higher in both cohorts. 
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Figure 6: Earning Point Distribution of High Skilled Male Pensioners 
  
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Western 39 -41 Western 55 -57 Eastern 39 -41 Eastern 55 - 57 
25% percentile 31.02 21.84 47.18 34.52 
50% percentile 44.71 54.51 51.00 51.59 
75% percentile 53.79 70.58 55.24 65.29 
Mean 42.29 47.48 51.05 50.03 
Std. Dev. 14.13 25.39 6.36 18.36 
Skewness  -0.29 -0.32 -0.12 -0.08 
Kurosis 2.09 1.61 3.24 1.90 
< 25 EP 16.09% 27.96% 0.00% 10.29% 
 p-Value p-Value 
KS -Test 0.000 0.000 
MW-U-Test 0.000 0.967 
Median-Test 0.000 0.499 
Source: authors’ calculation 
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Figure 7: Earning Point Distribution of Low Skilled Male Pensioners 
  
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Western 39 -41 Western 55 -57 Eastern 39 -41 Eastern 55 - 57 
25% percentile 23.78 13.59 32.75 19.02 
50% percentile 32.25 28.39 37.37 24.36 
75% percentile 41.42 45.86 46.25 36.63 
Mean 32.32 30.44 39.11 27.86 
Std. Dev. 11.88 18.85 8.44 12.41 
Skewness  0.00 0.32 0.13 1.10 
Kurosis 2.54 2.03 2.25 4.03 
< 25 EP 28.01% 44.71% 3.85% 53.41% 
 p-Value p-Value 
KS -Test 0.000 0.000 
MW-U-Test 0.000 0.000 
Median-Test 0.000 0.000 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
2.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
We now discuss the two main critical assumptions of our model and their impact on the 
estimated risk of old-age poverty. These critical assumption are the Time Factor (𝑇𝐹) equal to 
one and the constant Earning Point Value (𝐸𝑃𝑉). It is important to note that both of these 
assumptions do not influence the shape of the calculated 𝐸𝑃-distributions but shift the level. 
The first critical assumption is a 𝑇𝐹 equal to one. This assumption does not perfectly reflect 
the reality but is also not entirely unrealistic. In 2008, the seniority set by law was 65 and the 
average retirement age in Germany was 63.4 years for men and 63.0 years for women [BMAS 
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(2009)]. These values are equivalent to a mean 𝑇𝐹 of 0.95 for men and 0.93 for women. What 
are the consequences of a 𝑇𝐹 smaller than one for old-age poverty? It reduces the 𝑀𝑃 and 
therefore raises the risk of poverty among the elderly. Including a 𝑇𝐹 ≠ 1 into the simulation 
would be interesting, if we could observe the differences in retirement age according to sex, 
skill, cohort and residence. In particular, people with low wages should have an incentive for 
early retirement if their accrued pension rights do not exceed the level of social assistance. 
Unfortunately, such detailed information about retirement ages is not available from social 
security statistics.  
The second critical assumption is a constant 𝐸𝑃𝑉. The following equation shows the 
calculation of the 𝐸𝑃𝑉. 
𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑡 = 𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
𝜔𝑡−1
𝜔𝑡−2
∗
1− 𝜏𝑡−1−𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡−1
1− 𝜏𝑡−2−𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡−2
∗ ((1 −
𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑡−1
𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑡−2
) 𝛼 + 1).  (1.3) 
The 𝐸𝑃𝑉 in period 𝑡 is determined by the 𝐸𝑃𝑉 in 𝑡 − 1 the gross wages, 𝜔, the contribution 
rates, 𝜏, to the supplementary private savings (Riester pensions), 𝑆𝑃𝑃, old-age dependency 
ratio, 𝑂𝐷𝑅, and an exogenous parameter which controls for the impact of variation of the 
𝑂𝐷𝑅. Higher wages increase the current 𝐸𝑃𝑉 whereas higher contribution rates, higher 
supplementary private savings, and a positive 𝑂𝐷𝑅 growth lowers the current 𝐸𝑃𝑉. In the 
near future, the 𝑂𝐷𝑅 will begin to rise tremendously and will therefore decrease the 𝐸𝑃𝑉.26 
The development of wages is difficult to forecast. To avoid an absolute fall of pensions, a 
nominal decline of the 𝐸𝑃𝑉 is excluded by law.27 However, inflation may cause a real decline 
of the 𝐸𝑃𝑉 over time. To depict the influence of a diminishing 𝐸𝑃𝑉 we calculated a worst 
                                                          
26
 The aging of the German society and the low fertility rates will increase the 𝑂𝐷𝑅. 
27
 Considering current legislation the EPV-Formula changes actually to:  
𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑡−1, 𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑡−1 ∗
𝜔𝑡−1
𝜔𝑡−2
∗
1− 𝜏𝑡−1−𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡−1
1− 𝜏𝑡−2−𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑡−2
∗ ((1 −
𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑡−1
𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑡−2
) 𝛼 + 1)}. 
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case scenario with no 𝐸𝑃𝑉- growth. Moreover we assumed an inflation rate of 2% from the 
year 2009 on. With a constant 𝐸𝑃𝑉 and 2% inflation each year the critical threshold for an 
old-age poverty risk is c. p. 30 𝐸𝑃 in 2020.28 Table 5 provides an overview of the increased 
old-age poverty. In this worst case scenario the higher threshold in 2020 is much more critical 
for low skilled males in comparison to high- and medium-skilled workers because of their 
lower 𝐸𝑃 level. As described above the risk is overestimated for the high skilled and parts of 
the medium skilled. Furthermore, the overall high old-age poverty risk for women becomes 
even higher, especially in Western Germany. An important issue while discussing 𝐸𝑃𝑉-
forecasting is also the discretionary intervention of politics. It is hardly possible to forecast the 
evolution of the 𝐸𝑃𝑉 as the legislation is often amended to enable positive 𝐸𝑃𝑉 growth. 
Given this uncertainty a status quo projection seems to be the most appropriate approach. 
Table 5: Worst Case Scenario Calculation (Cohort 1955-1957) 
 Male Pensioners Female Pensioners 
 Skill Level  <25EP <30EP <25EP <30EP 
Western Germany 
 High  27.96% 32.00% 51.79% 59.87% 
 Medium  31.97% 38.43% 62.17% 71.51% 
 Low  44.71% 52.02% 77.09% 83.31% 
 All  32.34% 38.47% 62.85% 71.68% 
Eastern Germany 
 High  10.29% 18.61% 17.92% 27.66% 
 Medium  18.82% 31.63% 37.13% 52.89% 
 Low  53.41% 63.64% 61.03% 77.21% 
 All  18.31% 30.48% 34.93% 50.49% 
Source: authors’ calculation 
 
                                                          
28
 An inflation rate of 2% pushes the means-tested benefits from 583.50 € (Eastern Germany) and 664 € 
(Western Germany) to 725.51 € and 825.60 €. Using the 2009 𝐸𝑃𝑉 this translates into a threshold of 30.07 𝐸𝑃 
for Eastern Germany and 30.35 𝐸𝑃 for Western Germany. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Is there a growing risk of old-age poverty in Germany? Is old-age poverty more relevant in 
Eastern Germany? In both parts of Germany, we find a growing risk of old-age poverty and 
identify education as an important determinant. Especially low-skilled workers face a high 
risk of old-age poverty. In Eastern Germany, the risk of old-age poverty is growing more 
rapidly than in Western Germany in every skill group, but for new retirees in the years 2020 - 
2022, it is still smaller in magnitude than in Western Germany. Men and women face more or 
less the same situation. In Eastern Germany, medium- and high-skilled women have benefited 
from better income opportunities after the reunification. 
An analysis based on the statutory pension system clearly has its limits. First, old-age incomes 
stemming from other sources (e.g., private and occupational pension schemes) are completely 
ignored. Nevertheless, the statutory pension is and will be the most important pillar of old-age 
income in Germany. Future research should focus on the second and third pillars of the 
German pension system. 
There is first empirical evidence for the saving behavior of German households from SAVE 
Dataset of the Mannheim Research Institute for the Economic of Aging (MEA). Coppola 
(2008) summarizes the initial findings out of this dataset. Coppola (2008) finds a positive 
correlation of income and savings. She also shows evidence for an increasing number of 
people with private or occupational pension plans. In 2003, 80% of all respondents had no 
private pension plan; this number fell to 50% in 2007. This result shows an awareness among 
the population to diversify their old-age provision but also reinforce our finding of a growing 
risk of old-age poverty. People with few 𝐸𝑃 (because of disruptions and gaps in their 
employment biography and/or because of small incomes) are not likely to overcome their old-
age poverty risk via private pension plans. 
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Second, we do not consider couples. Future research should therefore consider the family 
situation. First empirical evidence is provided by Deutsche Rentenversicherung (2007) and 
Krenz et. al. (2009). Both find higher old-age poverty risks for unmarried and divorced men 
and women whereas couples as well as widows face low old-age poverty risks. 
What are the implications of our findings? The growing percentage of people with pension 
claims below the level of social assistance creates a challenge for policies. To overcome this 
problem the literature proposes mandatory private savings with tax-financed support of low 
income earners and of long-term unemployed [Bonin (2009)]. Such a reform may lower the 
tax burden in the future when more people can rely on their savings. The support for current 
low-income household, however, requires additional tax revenues today. 
Another opportunity to attenuate old-age poverty is proposed by Breyer & Hupfeld (2009). 
They propose a new benefit formula which takes individual life-expectancy into account. The 
new formula models the idea of distributive neutrality which leads to higher benefits for 
people with a lower life expectancy. The new benefit formula leads to a concave relationship 
between the annual earnings and the annual retirement benefits. By using data from the 
Federation of German Pension Insurance Institutes they show that their new formula reduces 
the old-age poverty risk among long-term contributors to the system. 
Our research findings imply a significant increase of old-age poverty risk in Germany. An 
increasing number of pensions will have to be supplemented by social assistance because the 
individual pension claims are too low. Applying for supplementary social assistance creates a 
social stigmatization which is often criticized in German politics. The municipalities provide 
the supplementary social assistance and are compensated for this from the federal budget. To 
overcome social stigmatization the statutory pension insurance could simply pay all old-age 
incomes. The implicit minimum pension would be converted into an explicit minimum 
pension. As this is a pure transfer of resources between government institutions, the reform 
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would be fiscally neutral. In contrast to reform measures that imply a stronger move towards a 
Beveridge system, the proposed small reform option does not further distort the labor supply. 
Another policy options is the introduction of a minimum pension that is paid without means-
testing. Even if this minimum pension is set at the level of current social assistance (means-
tested), it will create additional fiscal burdens as take-up rates will increase. 
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2.8 Appendix 
Figure 8: Earning Point Distribution of Medium Skilled Male Pensioners 
  
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Western 39 -41 Western 55 -57 Eastern 39 -41 Eastern 55 - 57 
25% percentile 30.28 20.02 39.59 27.43 
50% percentile 40.27 39.38 44.12 36.28 
75% percentile 49.07 54.65 49.42 44.63 
Mean 39.84 38.70 44.53 36.93 
Std. Dev. 12.63 21.63 6.95 12.58 
Skewness  -0.06 0.15 0.14 0.60 
Kurosis 2.47 2.04 2.49 3.41 
< 25 EP 13.68% 31.97% 0.00% 18.82% 
 p-Value p-Value 
KS -Test 0.000 0.000 
MW-U-Test 0.000 0.000 
Median-Test 0.002 0.000 
Source: authors’ calculation 
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Figure 9: Earning Point Distribution of Low Skilled Female Pensioners 
  
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Western 39 -41 Western 55 -57 Eastern 39 -41 Eastern 55 - 57 
25% percentile 11.41 7.48 19.80 15.35 
50% percentile 17.14 13.51 24.59 20.68 
75% percentile 23.56 23.54 28.06 28.81 
Mean 18.06 17.65 23.85 23.86 
Std. Dev. 8.62 13.69 6.09 11.47 
Skewness  0.55 1.51 -0.26 1.40 
Kurosis 3.08 5.63 2.49 6.05 
< 25 EP 79.20% 77.09% 53.61% 61.03% 
 p-Value p-Value 
KS -Test 0.000 0.000 
MW-U-Test 0.000 0.054 
Median-Test 0.000 0.024 
Source: authors’ calculation 
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Figure 10: Earning Point Distribution of Medium Skilled Female Pensioners 
  
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Western 39 -41 Western 55 -57 Eastern 39 -41 Eastern 55 - 57 
25% percentile 14.35 10.38 24.33 21.6 
50% percentile 20.47 19.53 29.45 29.05 
75% percentile 28.4 32.29 35.46 41.16 
Mean 21.98 23.06 29.82 31.83 
Std. Dev. 10.34 15.91 7.99 13.08 
Skewness  0.66 0.99 -0.09 0.68 
Kurosis 3.15 3.67 2.92 2.86 
< 25 EP 66.04% 62.17% 27.77% 37.13% 
 p-Value p-Value 
KS -Test 0.000 0.000 
MW-U-Test 0.000 0.192 
Median-Test 0.000 0.183 
Source: authors’ calculation 
  
2 A Fragile Pillar: Statutory Pensions and the Risk of Old-age Poverty in Germany 
 
43 
 
Figure 11: Earning Point Distribution of High Skilled Female Pensioners 
  
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
 Western 39 -41 Western 55 -57 Eastern 39 -41 Eastern 55 - 57 
25% percentile 13.62 11.31 38.11 28.49 
50% percentile 21.77 23.76 42.32 43.64 
75% percentile 33.72 41.52 46.62 57.72 
Mean 24.20 27.99 41.71 43.68 
Std. Dev. 12.95 19.65 8.29 16.95 
Skewness  0.57 0.069 -0.62 0.05 
Kurosis 2.56 2.51 4.05 1.83 
< 25 EP 59.39% 51.79% 5.30% 17.92% 
 p-Value p-Value 
KS -Test 0.000 0.000 
MW-U-Test 0.096 0.075 
Median-Test 0.043 0.105 
Source: authors’ calculation 
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3 Is There a Growing Risk of Old-age Poverty in Eastern 
Germany?
1
 
by Stefan Arent, Wolfgang Nagl and Joachim Ragnitz 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Every now and then there is a public and political debate about the growing old-age poverty 
risk in Eastern Germany. Besides other arguments, there are two points one has to consider 
seriously: demographic change and the difficult labor market situation in Eastern Germany 
after reunification. With regard to demographic change, the main point is the increasing 
proportion of retired people in relation to the labor force. Over time this will lead to 
decreasing benefits in terms of statutory pension insurance. A more relevant problem 
concerning old-age poverty is unemployment in Eastern Germany. Many people have 
disruptions and gaps in their employment biography. For the old-age income situation this is 
negative in two ways. First of all, people do not acquire as much entitlement to the statutory 
pension as they would if they were working. This is especially a problem for long-term 
unemployed people. After the labor market legislation reforms of 2003 and 2004, this group 
earns nearly no pension claims during long-term unemployment periods. Secondly, people are 
not able to make sufficient private or occupational provision while unemployed.  
So is there a growing risk of old-age poverty for German households? To our knowledge, 
there is only one study which analyzes this question by focusing on marital status [Deutsche 
Rentenversicherung Bund, 2007)]. This study finds that an increasing proportion of 
households have a “low” overall old-age income (statutory pension, private and occupational 
pension) by comparing the cohorts 1942 to 1946 with the cohorts 1957 to 1961. Unfortunately 
the authors did not calculate the proportion of households with a risk of old-age poverty (i.e. a 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is published as "Is There a Growing Risk of Old-Age Poverty in EasternGermany?" in Applied 
Economics Quarterly Supplement 55 (60), 2009, 35-54. 
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retirement income below the level of Social Assistance). Also, the sample size does not allow 
for a detailed distribution of old-age income to be described, so the authors have to define 
specific income groups.
2
 In contrast to this study, we can answer this question by focusing on 
German statutory pension insurance and on the marital status of the households. We do this 
for two reasons. Firstly, there are no reliable data concerning occupational pension schemes 
and private retirement arrangements which would allow us to create detailed income 
distributions. Second, the benefits from the statutory pension insurance are, and will be in the 
future, the most important income source for pensioners. Today the share of income from the 
statutory pension insurance to the whole old-age income is about 90% and will only slightly 
decrease to 85% in 2020.
3
 Taking this fact into account, focusing on the statutory pension can 
help create a good approximation of the old-age income and therefore of old-age poverty risk 
(civil servants and self-employed may have additional/alternative pension schemes). In order 
to detect changes in old-age poverty risk over time we focus on new pensioners in the years 
2004 – 2006 and compare them with new pensioners in 2020 – 2022. We analyze the impact 
of marital status because the majority of the elderly have partners and marital status is 
particularly important for the old age income of the household [Deutsche Rentenversicherung 
Bund (2007)]. Although we are mainly interested in the situation in Eastern Germany, in 
addition we will calculate the situation for Western Germany, in order to find similarities as 
well as differences. 
Our analysis starts with a short description of the German Pension System (3.2). Section 3.3 
summarizes demographic facts for Eastern Germany. The proportion of people who live in a 
relationship increases with age. It is important for our analysis that widows are the second 
largest group of female retirees. In section 3.4 we present our methodology and data. We 
                                                          
2
 Studies later on calculate at least the old-age poverty risk [see Gühne et al. (2012)]. 
3
 See Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2007). 
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construct a micro-simulation-model and use data from the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB) and the German Federal Pension Fund. Subsequently, we present a comparison of the 
situation of new pensioners in 2004 – 2004 and 2020 – 2022. We start with our calculation for 
single households in section 3.5. While the old-age poverty risk for single females does not 
change, we find a growing risk for single males. The results for couples in section 3.6 confirm 
the trend towards a more tense income situation for elderly people in 2020. In section 3.7 we 
show that widows are the best protected group with respect to the statutory pension system. 
Section 3.8 concludes. 
 
3.2 The German Pension System 
The German Pension System is based on three pillars. The first and most important is the 
statutory pension system. In 2004 over 90% of the old-age income of new retirees in Eastern 
Germany was based on the statutory pension. This number will decrease slightly to 85% by 
2020. The second pillar consists of occupational pension schemes. This pillar will become 
more important over time. Its average share of the total old-age income in Eastern Germany 
will increase from 5% (2004) to 10% (2020). The third pillar consists of private retirement 
arrangements. The share of these will also rise from 2% (2004) to 5% (2020).
4
 We focus our 
analysis on the statutory pension scheme in Germany in order to judge the risk of old-age 
poverty. The number of private and occupational pension schemes illustrates that this 
approach is well justified. 
The German statutory pension system is a pay-as–you-go-pension system. The monthly 
pension (MP) of a retired person is determined by four factors as given in the following 
equation:  
                                                          
4
 See Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2007). 
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𝑀𝑃 =  𝑇𝐹 ∗  𝑃𝐹 ∗  𝐸𝑃𝑉 ∗  𝐸𝑃.    (2.1) 
 
The Time Factor (TF) depends on retirement age. At the regular retirement age (we assume 
65 years) it is equal to one. With respect to old-age pensions, the Pension Factor (PF) is also 
equal to one. It deviates for other pension types (e.g. surviving dependant's or disability 
pension). The Earning Point Value (EPV) translates the Earning Points (EP) into an amount of 
money. It is determined by three factors: a demographic factor, the growth rate of wages, and 
a factor which takes into account the growth of the contribution rate to the statutory pension 
insurance. The EPV is calculated separately for each year in Eastern and Western Germany. 
For our analysis we keep the EPV constant. In the following analysis we focus on the EP 
distribution. The EP is calculated as a ratio of the individual income and the average income 
in Western Germany.
5
 Because of the lower wage level in Eastern Germany, the individual 
income is increased by a multiplier
6
 which takes the different wage levels in both parts of 
Germany into account. Labor income is subject to social insurance contributions up to the 
social security contribution ceiling.
7
 Besides socially secured employment, an individual also 
acquires EP during unemployment. When receiving unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld 
I) an amount of 80% of the previous income is taken into consideration in order to calculate 
the EP. During long term unemployment (Arbeitslosengeld II) the calculation base is 205 € 
per month. This is equivalent to about 0.1 EP per year. 
 
                                                          
 
6
 In 2008 the raising factor was 1.1827. 
7
 54.600 € (East) and 64.800 € (West) in 2009. 
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3.3 Demographic Setting in Eastern Germany 
The risk of old-age poverty depends largely on marital status. Hereby it is most important 
whether an individual lives alone or is also supported by a partner. So what are the facts for 
Eastern Germany? The current age pyramid for Eastern Germany in Figure 12 shows that the 
higher the age the lower the share of non-widowed singles. For people over 65, the proportion 
of singles is about 2% for men and 8% for women. In this age-group, 85% of the men and 
47% of the women are married. The lower percentage of married women is due to the fact 
that there are a large number of female widows. 45% of all women over 65-year-old are 
widowed, in comparison with only 13% of men. In what follows, these shares are assumed for 
both cohorts.
8
  
Figure 12: Family Situation of Households in Eastern Germany 
Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany (2008), authors’ calculations. 
We define a person or couple as poor if their entitlements do not exceed the social assistance 
which is guaranteed by the German welfare system. For people who live alone, we assume 30 
                                                          
8
 BMFSFJ (2000) shows evidence for a high and constant share of partnerships of elderly people. 
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EP as the critical threshold. 30 EP are currently equivalent to 700.20 € in Eastern Germany 
and 796.80 € in Western Germany. For couples, we set 48 EP as the critical threshold. This is 
currently equivalent to 1120.32 € in Eastern Germany and 1274.88 € in Western Germany.
9
 
 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
In contrast to the related literature, we derive Pension Point distributions for elderly single 
households, couples and widows with respect to education. To identify changes in the risk of 
old-age poverty, we focus on the number of EPs of new pensioners in the period 2004 to 2006 
compared to the EPs of people who retired between 2020 and 2022. Hereby we distinguish 
between three skill levels. An individual is considered as low-skilled if he/she is lacking 
vocational training. A medium-skill level is reached when vocational training was completed 
successfully. Individuals with an academic degree are defined as being highly qualified. We 
also calculate separate distributions for men and women. We assume for all individuals a 
retirement age of 65, so the “old” cohort of new pensioners was born between 1939 and 1941. 
The “young” cohort consists of people who were born between 1955 and 1957. 
Methodologically our work is based on the analysis of elderly single households in Arent & 
Nagl (2010).
10
  
The most important dataset in our analysis is the IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe: Scientific Use 
File Regionalfile 1975 – 2004 (IABS-R04) from the German Institute for the Labor Market 
and Job Research (IAB). This dataset is a two percent sample of all German workers within 
the social security system. We chose this dataset mainly because of its size. There are datasets 
from the Research Center of the German Pension Fund which might fit better due the 
                                                          
9
 In later analysis we reduce the critical threshold to 25 EP because of the increasing Earning Point Value (EPV) 
and comments by the referees [Arent and Nagl (2010)]. 
10
 Arent and Nagl (2010) describe the methodology for calculating the EP in detail. Furthermore a description of 
the datasets is given. 
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information they hold, but they are nearly twenty times smaller than the IABS-R04. When we 
analyze different skill levels the size of the dataset becomes very important. Especially for the 
persons without vocational training the sample of the Research Center of the German Pension 
Fund is too small. The IABS-R04 provides information on a daily basis from 1975 till 2004 
for Western Germany and from 1992 to 2004 for Eastern Germany. The IABS-R04 allows for 
deriving EP distributions according to age, gender, place of residence and skill. For each 
person in the sample, the daily income is known, as well as the exact periods of 
unemployment. The composition of the samples with respect to skills, gender and age in the 
IABS-R04 is given in Figure 13 and Figure 14.  
Figure 13: Distribution of Skill-levels in Eastern Germany 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 14: Distribution of Skill-levels in Western Germany 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
In order to assess the whole employment biography, we added information from the SUF 
FDZ-Biografiedatensatz – VSKT 2005 Quelle: FDZ-RV (VSKT 2005) to the IABS-R04 that 
we obtained from the Research Data Centre of the German Federal Pension Fund. The VSKT 
2005 contains information about the monthly EP according to age, gender, place of residence 
and skill. We combined the IABS-R04 with the much smaller VSKT 2005, using a bootstrap 
method [see Arent and Nagl (2010)]. 
To derive a picture for new pensioners in 2020 to 2022 we can make projections for 
individual employment patterns. We can do this by extrapolating the employment patterns 
given in the IABS-R04. We can assume that the individual probability of employment, 
unemployment and long term unemployment will not change until 2020-2022.  
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3.5 Single-person Households 
Non-widowed single-person households are the group with the highest risk of old-age 
poverty. As mentioned above, this group is not that large, but it is a significant part of society. 
Because of the lack of specific data, we use the EP distribution of the whole dataset for 
single-person households. For male pensioners this appears to be an appropriate approach 
because a full-time working career for men is usually considered independently of marital 
status. For females this is only the case in Eastern Germany. In Western Germany the 
calculated EP of females are strongly affected by the marital status because of the lower labor 
participation of married females. Therefore the results of female single-person households 
should be interpreted with caution.  
 
3.5.1 Males 
Figure 15 shows the EP distribution of all men in Eastern and Western Germany. The dark 
color represents the cohort of 1939 to 1941, the bright color the cohort of 1955 to 1957. 
Indeed, the mean EP level is almost constant but we observe an increasing old-age poverty 
risk in both parts of Germany. For single males the risk of old-age poverty rises tremendously 
in Eastern Germany: whereas in the “old” cohort, only 1.34% of men acquired less than 30 
EP. In the “young” cohort this number increases to 31.60%.  
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Figure 15: Earning-Point-Distribution of Male Pensioners 
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
  
 Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Skill Level 1939-41 1955-57 1939 - 41 1955-57 
Medium 21.98% 36.32% 0.93% 31.27% 
High  22.62% 30.96% none 17.52% 
Low 45.57% 54.69% 8.19% 67.25% 
All  28.26% 39.17% 1.34% 31.60%.  
Source: authors’ calculations.
11
 
The special contribution of our analysis is the skill-specific and marital status approach. 
Figure 15 describes the share of persons below the critical value of 30 EP with respect to all 
pensioners of the same skill level. The medium level forms the majority and will be the first 
to be analyzed in what follows. Over time we observe an increasing portion of pensioners 
below the critical threshold. Part of this group probably has no or little private or occupational 
pensions because of their weak income situation. However, some pensioners in this group 
might be protected by other pension schemes due to their career type (e.g. civil servant or 
self-employed). These are people who are insured by the statutory pension insurance for more 
                                                          
11
 Here we use 30 EP as critical level. In chapter 2 the critical threshold was set to 25 [Arent and Nagl (2010)]. 
3 Is There a Growing Risk of Old-age Poverty in Eastern Germany? 
 
54 
 
than five years but may be came civil servant or self-employment later in their career. The 
Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2007) claims that the high percentage of people below 
30 EP is a consequence of this. In general, we can state that most of the medium skilled single 
males in both parts of Germany will get a statutory pension at a sufficient level. In Eastern 
Germany the statutory pension provides the major element of the whole old-age income, 
while especially in Western Germany private and occupational pensions back up the statutory 
pension [see Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2007)]. 
Employees with a graduate degree are a case apart, because of two facts. This group contains 
a great number of people working outside the statutory pension system (civil servants as well 
as the self-employed) receiving only few pension points. Highly skilled employees inside the 
social security system normally reach a high average level of statutory pension in both regions 
and for all cohorts and will not face the risk of old-age poverty. The scenario for employees 
without vocational education is the most critical. Our forecast for this group shows a high 
percentage of people near or below the critical EP value. Except for the “old” cohort in 
Eastern Germany, at least 45% have less than 30 EP. Comparing the cohorts, we find that the 
huge unemployment and the low income reduces the accrued EP of the “younger” cohort 
dramatically. In the times of the former GDR, this group earned comparable wages to 
medium-skilled workers. Due to the structural change after German unification, the labor 
market chances of low-skilled workers worsened. However, in Western Germany more then 
54% of the “young” cohort face a high old-age poverty risk. Many employees of this 
education level are often not able to acquire private or occupational pensions, so a high share 
of this group will need  basic public financial security in old-age (Grundsicherung im Alter). 
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3.5.2 Females 
The situation of the females is quite different to that of the males. On average, the percentage 
of women with less than 30 EP is constant at about 51% in Eastern Germany.  
Figure 16: Earning-Point-Distribution of Female Pensioners 
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
  
 Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Skill Level 1939-41 1955-57 1939-41 1955 - 57 
Medium 77.31% 70.22% 51.41% 52.25% 
High  68.54% 58.34% 7.67% 22.80% 
Low 89.80% 84.68% 84.68% 81.35% 
All 81.66% 72.64% 51.39% 51.36% 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
The distribution of EP is described in Figure 16 for all women in Eastern and Western 
Germany. The females show a typical right-skewed distribution except for the “old” cohort in 
Eastern Germany. Again, the mean EP level is relatively constant, but in both parts of 
Germany we can observe a high old-age poverty risk for all cohorts. In general, the 
percentages beneath the critical threshold are lower for Eastern German women.  
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Medium-skilled women are better protected in Eastern Germany. The reason for this can be 
found in the employment situation in the former GDR. Females often worked full-time in 
contrast to females in Western Germany, where many women were employed only part-time 
[Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2007)]. In the absence of other protection (e.g. via 
family) more than 70% of both cohorts in Western Germany will need social transfers to 
reach the level of social assistance. The reason is the traditional choice to be employed part-
time or to be a housewife. In Western Germany the “young” cohort of medium-skilled women 
shows a stronger tendency to full-time employment, so some women generate higher levels of 
EP, which leads to a decreasing risk of poverty. There is a different situation in Eastern 
Germany. The higher labor participation of females here leads to a lower percentage of 
women who face the risk of old-age poverty.  
Quite a different picture arises for highly qualified females. Here we find strong differences in 
both cohorts in Eastern and Western Germany. While single women with an academic degree 
in Eastern Germany reach approximately the mean EP level of medium-skilled men, about 60 
to 70% of women in Western Germany will get an EP level below the critical threshold. 
Therefore, the increase in the number of women who choose full-time employment in 
Western Germany plays an important role in the decrease of the risk of old-age poverty 
(minus 10%). For Eastern Germany the risk of old-age poverty is much smaller than in 
Western Germany (only 23% of the “young” cohort is affected). Nevertheless, we can observe 
an increase in the percentage in Eastern Germany. The reason is the same as for highly skilled 
men (civil service, self-employment). In addition, part-time employment and being a 
housewife also plays a role.  
As with low-skilled males, the highest risk of old-age poverty is found in low-skilled females. 
Over time we can observe a constant high ratio of females facing old-age poverty risk. 
Thereby the high risk for the “old” cohort in Eastern Germany is surprising, because men of 
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the same skill level and cohort are protected, like medium-skilled. The rate in both parts of 
Germany is always over 80%. Most of the low-skilled single females do not participate in 
private or occupational pension schemes and so they need access to additional social transfers.  
 
3.6 Two-Person-Households 
The old-age risk of couples is the most important issue to be analyzed because the majority of 
all pensioners live in a marriage [see Figure 12]. One of our main results is that most couples 
in Eastern Germany do not face a great old-age poverty risk, although the situation will be 
more difficult by 2020. Methodically we base our two-person household analysis on the 
results of Federal Statistical Office Germany (2008) and the former individual information. 
This analysis uses the Mikrozensus 2005 to access information about the marital status of 
German households and shown that the majority of relationships exist between partners with 
similar educational levels. In more of 20% of the cases, the man has a higher vocational 
education and in about 10% this is reversed. We can assume that these percentages hold for 
both parts of Germany and can adopt them to the skill level groups of our dataset (see Figure 
13 and Figure 14).
12
 
Our procedure is the following. First, we match men and women with the same skill level. 
The remaining men are matched with females of a lower educational level. The remaining 
females are assigned to a man with higher education. The following example illustrates our 
method and its restrictions. We observe 1,000 medium-skilled men and 1,000 medium-skilled 
women in a cohort. 60% of all men and women are matched with partners of the same skill 
level. Subsequently, 400 medium-skilled women remain for a possible partnership with a 
high-skilled man. Assuming a low quantity of (for example) 100 high-skilled men. 60 are 
used for equally educated couples and only 40 remain for a partnership with a medium-skilled 
                                                          
12
 For simplicity we use all individuals of our dataset for the matching process. 
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woman. Therefore the number of couples with a higher skilled man and a lower skilled 
woman is always determined by the quantity of the group with fewer members in the dataset 
and we cannot match all individuals.
13
 Thereby the case of higher skilled women is excluded, 
because of technical matters and their minor relevance. For the same reasons we exclude 
relationships being separated by two skill levels. 
Figure 17 summarizes the resulting percentages of partnership combinations. The five 
different household-types capture over 90% of all partnership constellations in Germany [see 
Federal Statistical Office Germany (2008)]. 
Figure 17: Shares of Different Relationships with Respect to all Two-Person Households 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Using this skill distribution, we can construct a model to describe the household incomes 
received from the statutory pension insurance. The method used to create a detailed picture of 
the households’ statutory pensions is to generate random distributions of old-age income for 
                                                          
13
 A maximum of 4% of a skill group is left after the matching process. 
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the different partnership constellations. We stochastically combine males and females 
according to their education level, place of residence (Eastern or Western Germany) and 
cohort.
14
 As a result we get EP distributions for the five main types of households (compare 
Figure 17). We will begin with the most common combination of medium-skilled men and 
women.  
                                                          
14
 A description of the matching method can be found in the appendix. 
3 Is There a Growing Risk of Old-age Poverty in Eastern Germany? 
 
60 
 
Figure 18: Earning-Point-Distribution of Two-Person Households 
Western Germany Eastern Germany 
  
 Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Skill Levels 1939-41 1955-57 1939-41 1955-57 
Low/Low (type1) 44.99% 54.24% 7.11% 48.23% 
Medium/Medium (type2) 18.64% 30.09% 0.42% 12.34% 
High/High (type 3) 16.19% 21.05% None 5.01% 
Medium/Low (type 4) 24.22% 38.70% 1.35% 22.19% 
High/Medium (type 5) 18.13% 25.55% None 8.35% 
All 28.57% 34.29% 1.27% 12.55% 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
Although the “old” cohort (1939 to 1941) of type 2 (medium-medium-partnership) 
households in both parts of Germany faces a relatively low old-age poverty risk (West: 18%; 
East: 0.42%) this percentage increases over time (in the 1955 to 1957 cohort). In Eastern 
Germany the growth is dramatic but the rate is still lower than in Western Germany (30% vs. 
12%). Besides increasing unemployment, civil servant status and self-employment induce a 
growing heterogeneity of incomes. Most of the people in these age groups seem to be 
protected against old-age poverty by the statutory pension. This result is confirmed even more 
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if we bear in mind the possibility of additional private and/or occupational pensions, 
especially in Western Germany. 
In Eastern Germany, the medium-low-relationship (type 4) has a share of 5 to 10% (see 
Figure 17). In Western Germany and medium-low-partnership combination show has a share 
of 15 to 20%. Also the share of low-low-partnerships (type 1) is higher in Western Germany. 
The main reason for this is the higher percentage of low-skilled people in Western Germany. 
Especially type 1 households have a very high risk of old-age poverty. The situation for 
medium-low-relationships is similar to that of medium-medium households. The old-age 
poverty risk of the medium-low-partnership, however, is on a higher level. One plausible 
explanation for this may be the poor labor market opportunities for low-skilled women. In 
consequence, the financial situation for such partnership is more problematic than for type 2 
households. In particular, type 4 households of the “young” cohort face a higher old-age 
poverty risk (38% resp. 22%) in both parts of Germany. 
As might be expected, the low-low households show the highest old-age poverty risk. Like 
single low-skilled males only the “old” cohort in Eastern Germany generates a sufficient level 
of statutory pension (93% over 48 EP). In Western Germany this group represents about 20% 
of all two-person households. For the “young” cohort in Eastern Germany, the same 
statements as for singles can be made. The risk will increase dramatically (7% for the “old” 
cohort vs. 62% for the “young”). Due to the problem of missing private and/or occupational 
pension schemes these persons will probably need additional social transfers to reach basic 
income security. 
The two remaining type 3 and 5 represent a small number of relationships but for these groups 
we expect no old-age poverty. We can observe about 20% of households under the 48 EP 
thresholds. But, as in the case of singles, the majority of couples below the critical threshold is 
presumably protected outside the statutory pension system (civil service or self-employment). 
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Again the ratio is increasing over time because of alternative career opportunities (civil 
servant or self employed). Also the possibility of additional private and occupational 
protection is much higher for these groups [see Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2007)] 
 
3.7 Widows 
Widows are the best protected group with respect to the statutory pension system in our 
analysis.
15
 In Eastern Germany widows face almost no risk of old-age poverty. For widows 
we use the results of two-person household analysis with a different critical limit (30 EP as 
for singles). Methodically, we assume the household qualification types also for widows (see 
Table 6). The pension is calculated in a simple way: A widow gets her own pension and in 
addition 55% of the claim of the deceased partner. Currently there are more specific rules for 
a dependent’s pension.
16
 These calculations apply at an income above the old-age poverty 
level. Therefore this has no impact on our analysis of old-age poverty risk. 
                                                          
15
 In what follows we concentrate on widows, because their numbers are much higher than widowers. In the 
group of those over 76 years, widows are the largest group (and growing), while the ratio of widowers is 
constant over time at a low level. Furthermore, men show a lower old-age poverty risk than women. An 
additional dependent’s pension improves their old-age income situation further. We cannot calculate the widow 
pension for woman without any earning point. Years of education as well as children create pension claims in 
Germany. Therefore almost every woman has at least a small pension claim. 
16
 There are several rules for cases in which the spouse dies before he/she was a pensioner. To make the analysis 
easier we can assume that the spouse reaches pension age. This assumption has a weak effect, because if the 
spouse dies before retirement age, the widow's pension is calculated on the basis of a hypothetical pension 
(reaching the regular pension age) with deductions [Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2012)]. A description 
of the methodology can be found in the Appendix. 
3 Is There a Growing Risk of Old-age Poverty in Eastern Germany? 
 
63 
 
Table 6: Percentage of Widows Below 30 EP in Respect to all Widows of the Same Type 
 Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Skill Levels 1939-41 1955-57 1939-41 1955-57 
Type 1 Widow (L/L) 49.45% 44.99% 4.74% 31.42% 
Type 2 Widow (M/M) 14.88% 25.78% 0.77% 5.01% 
Type 3 Widow (H/H) 11.21% 16.80% None 0.90% 
Type 4 Widow (M/L) 21.98% 37.29% 1.13% 14.79% 
Type 5 Widow (H/M) 13.64% 20.21% None 2.04% 
All 27.49% 28.79% 1.27% 5.65% 
Source: authors’ calculations. 
If we compare the risk of old-age poverty for widows to the risk in two-person households, 
we can observe a lower poverty risk for widows of each type. This is because of the 
enhancement of the old-age income by the additional dependent’s pension often outweighs 
the loss of the economic advantages of a two person household (economies of scale). Thereby 
the poverty threshold for two-person households plays an important role. The groups with the 
highest risk of old-age poverty are low-skilled widows of medium or low-skilled deceased 
men (type 1 and 4). The main reason is the low pension claim of the widow, which cannot be 
compensated by the added 55% EP of the deceased partner. In cases of medium-skilled men 
an additional private and/or occupational pension seems to be more likely as well as life 
insurance. In contrast, type 1 widows face the highest risk of old-age poverty.  
In other cases the percentage of widows with an old-age poverty risk is about or below 20%. 
Also the possibility of additional pension provisions seems to be higher here, especially in 
cases of high-skilled deceased partners. In Eastern Germany, widows of type 2, 3 and 5 reach 
a secure level of old-age income by statutory pension. The reason for that is the higher rate of 
full-time female employees and consecutively the higher level of their own EPs. In Western 
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Germany the percentages are higher because of the lower pension claims of the widows and 
the more heterogeneous income structure (see elderly singles).  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
At the beginning we posed the question of whether there is a growing risk of old-age poverty 
in Germany. Comparing the new pensioners in 2004-2006 with those of the period 2020-
2022, we found that, in general, the risk of post-retirement poverty increases for the latter 
group. With the exception of single females, we observed a growing poverty risk for all 
household types. The analysis shows also the importance of qualifications. Independent from 
the marital status, a higher skill level significantly decreases the risk of poverty in old age.  
What are the specific findings for Eastern Germany? The poverty risk for single males rises. 
The situation of single females seems to be unchanged over time. The situation of couples 
worsens a little, but is still on a secure level. Widows are the best protected household group 
in Eastern Germany. On average, they have not and will not have any greater problem in the 
future. Is the situation in Eastern Germany worse than in Western Germany? Because of the 
still prevailing employment biographies in the former GDR (with no unemployment), the 
situation in 2004 – 2006 and in 2020 – 2022 is better in Eastern Germany. In Western 
Germany unemployment began to be an issue in the mid-seventies. This is true for almost 
every skill level, for every type of household and for both men and women. 
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3.10 Appendix 
i) Methodology of creating couples 
To create couples, we use the skill and gender specific EP information. As a first step we 
bootstrap the skill specific samples of men and women to generate samples with an equal 
number of observations (expect the group of high skilled women). Second, we randomly 
match 60% of men and women with the same skill level. In 60% of all couples, both partners 
have the same skill level. We randomly match the remaining males with females of a lower 
educational level. A small number of high-skilled women and low skilled men are not 
matched. The following example illustrates the method. We observe 1,000 medium-skilled 
men and 1,000 medium-skilled women in a cohort. 60% of them are combined with partners 
of equal education.
17
 We create 600 random medium-medium-couples. (We do so for all three 
skill levels). Subsequently, 400 medium-skilled men and women are left. The 400 medium 
skilled males are randomly matched to low skilled women and the 400 medium skilled 
females are randomly matched high skilled males. Therefore the number of couples with a 
different skill level is always determined by the quantity of the group with fewer members in 
the dataset. For example, if we observe 100 high skilled men and 100 high skilled women. 
60% of them are randomly matched to high-high-couples. Thus 40 men are left for matching 
with medium skilled women. The calculation for low skilled is analogous. Because of its 
minor importance and to ease the calculation we exclude the case of couples in which the 
women has a higher skill level as the men. All matches consider the place of residence 
(Eastern or Western Germany) and the birth cohort. We assume the same cohort and the same 
place of residence for men and women.
18
  
                                                          
17
 We cannot observe the marginal distribution of partnerships with an equal education. 
18
 This assumption is somehow critical because usually the female partners are younger than the male. Our 
results show the old-age income for couples if both partners are retired. 
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ii) Calculation of widow pensions 
To calculate the widow’s pension, we use the information about couples and add 55% of the 
man´s pension to the pension of the woman.
19
 Our methodology suggests that the males reach 
the pension age before dying. We may overestimate the widow´s pension because of this 
assumption. The over estimation does not bias the analysis that much, because the 
institutional framework of the German statutory pension secure widows even if the partner 
dies before the pension age [Deutsche Rentenversicherung Bund (2012)]. The minimum 
widow's pension claim is based on a hypothetical pension level for which the deceased would 
have been 60 years old.
20
 
                                                          
19
 Years of education as well as children create pension claims in Germany. Therefore almost every woman has 
at least a small pension claim. 
20
 For simplicity we assume the year of death as being equal to the year of his retirement. 
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4 Unemployment Compensation and Wages: Evidence 
from the German Hartz-Reform
1
 
by Stefan Arent and Wolfgang Nagl 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the effect of decreasing unemployment compensation (UC) 
payments on wages in Germany. Economic theory predicts that decreasing UC leads to 
decreased wages and higher rates of employment. This effect is the result of a decreased 
outside option in the context of wage bargaining and has been extensively modeled in the 
literature on searching models (see Rogerson et al. 2005). Empirical findings from the US 
support this prediction but evidence for Germany is missing. We fill this gap by using the 
Hartz reforms as a quasi natural experiment. 
Two approaches can be used to examine empirically the effect of decreased UC on wages. 
The first approach is to measure the effect of UC on (reservation) wages by using survey data 
(see Feldstein and Poterba 1984, Addison et al. 2009 or McCall and Chi 2008). These studies 
use detailed individual information about reservation wages and examine whether the level of 
UC affects the reservation wage by a cross section analysis (comparing different US states or 
EU countries). The second approach is to measure the direct effect of UC on wages using 
administrative data (see Topel 1984). This approach has the advantage of large sample sizes. 
To determine the effect of decreased UC on wages, we follow the second approach, using 
exogenous variation of the UC that is generated by a quasi-natural experiment resulting from 
an extensive reform of the German labor market: the Hartz reforms. As a result of the Hartz 
reforms, the decreased unemployment assistance (UA) for individuals who are unemployed in 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is accepted for publication. Forthcoming in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonmie und Statistik (Journal 
for Economics and Statistics). 
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the long-term generates exogenous variation in the UC payments.
2
 The Hartz reforms were 
implemented between 2003 and 2006.  
The main components of these reforms include increasing the flexibility of the labor market 
and decreasing the overall amount of UA [see Jacobi and Kluve (2007)]. Prior to 2005, UA 
was calculated as a fraction of the individual’s earnings. Since 2005, however, the UA is 
means-tested and is not related to an individual’s income. We use panel data from the Federal 
Employment Agency of Germany (2008) [BA-Employment Panel 1998-2007] to analyze the 
effect of this UA reduction on wages. Former studies do not have the opportunity to use a 
quasi-natural experiment in combination with such detailed data. We use a sample of 2 
percent of all employees that were subject to social insurance contribution in Germany. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of the 
German Hartz reforms. Section 4.3 describes our data. In Section 4.4, we explain our method 
and estimation strategy. In Section 4.5, we show empirical evidence for a decreasing wage 
effect. Section 4.6 concludes this study. 
 
4.2 The German Hartz-Reform 
The Hartz reforms constitute the most comprehensive German labor market reform of the last 
decade.
3
 The Hartz reforms consist of four parts. Hartz I and Hartz II increase the flexibility 
of the German labor market; these reforms were introduced at the beginning of 2003. The 
primary components of the reforms were designed to ease temporary work, to introduce a new 
start-up grant scheme and to liberalize the Mini-Jobs legislation.
4
 Hartz III governs the 
                                                          
2
 In the following we use term unemployment assistance because the Hartz-reform affects the unemployment 
compensation, the social assistance and the unemployment assistance. 
3
 A good overview of legislative German labor market reforms since 1990 is provided by Ebbinghaus and 
Eichhorst (2006). 
4
For Mini Jobs (earnings up to 400 €) the contribution rate to the social insurance is decreased than for regular 
employment subjected to social insurance contribution. 
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reorganization of the German Federal Employment Agency. Hartz-IV is the most important 
Hartz reform for the empirical examination and consists of two main components.
5
 
The first and most important aspect of Hartz IV is the introtuction of a fixed and means-tested 
UA payment (ALG II) on the 1
st
 of January 2005. Prior to this date, the UA was determined 
by 53% (or 57% with a child) of the individual’s former net wages. In 2005, the UA 
transitioned to a means-tested and non-income-related payment at a fixed level of 345 € plus 
means-tested housing costs.
6
 Furthermore, after 2005, the law clearly stipulates that 
unemployed individuals must accept reasonable offers of employment. If an unemployed 
individual refuses a reasonable offer of employment, then his or her UA is reduced [Social 
Security Code; SGB II §31 et seq].  
Second, UA payments are now means-tested. If an individual has significant financial assets 
or if the individual’s partner has a sufficiently high income, his or her UA payments could 
decrease to zero. Schulte (2004) shows that after 2005, the overwhelming majority of German 
households’ financial assets do not exceed the maximum asset allowance of the UA. Like 
financial assets the spouse’s income plays a significant role in determining an unemployed 
individual’s UA payments. The Hartz-IV reform decreases the amount of the UA for 59% of 
households; 25% of all households lose the entirety of their UA claim. Couples without 
children are particularly affected by the Hartz-IV reform. Nearly every other couple without 
children (47%) loses their UA claim completely. For 82% of childless couples, the UA claim 
amount is decreased as a result of the reform. However, 72% of single-parent households 
receive a higher UA claim amount after 2005. On average, for single-person households and 
                                                          
5
 In addition top-up benefits has been introduced to ease the re-employment of long-term unemployed via a wage 
subsidy. 
6
 The ALG II replaced the two previous, parallel systems of non-means-tested unemployment assistance and 
means-tested social assistance. 
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couples with more than one child, the UA situation does not change substantially as a result of 
the Hartz-IV reform [Schulte (2004)].
7
 
The third important feature of the Hartz-IV reform was the shortage of the maximum period 
an individual was entitled to receive unemployment benefits (ALG I) to 18 months, effective 
on February 1
st
, 2006.
8
 The length of benefits entitlement depends on the length of the 
individual’s former employment and age. The minimum qualifying requirement to receive a 
short-term unemployment benefit (ALG I) for 6 months is a period of 12-month employment 
during the last 2 years. The ALG I is 60 % (or 67 % with a child) of individual’s previous net 
wage. The ALG I is not means-tested and has a maximum payment level.
9
 All components of 
the Hartz-IV reform reduce the expected value of financial support during unemployment. 
 
4.3 Data 
We use the BA-Employment Panel 1998-2007, which consists of 2 percent of all employees 
that were subject to social insurance contribution and are unemployed in Germany.
10
 This 
dataset is representative for those persons and contains quarterly information for individuals 
and firms from the first quarter of 1998 until the last quarter of 2007. We restrict our analysis 
to a balanced panel from the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of 2007. Prior to 2000, 
it was not possible to track individuals through periods of unemployment. Because we are 
interested in the effects of decreased UA payments on regular employees, we focus on full-
time employees. Our sample contains all individuals who worked at least one quarter between 
the first quarter of 2000 and the fourth quarter of 2007 or were registered as unemployed. 
                                                          
7
 Single person households with a net income of more than 1404€ are affected by the Hartz-IV-reform. 
8
 The legislation was later changed so that the maximum period is now 24 months for older employees. 
9
 The upper limit of ALG I depends on the (social security) contribution assessment ceiling.  
10
 A detailed description of the data can be found in Schmucker and Seth (2009) 
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Our sample contains the following data on individuals: sex, age, wage, employment status, 
job tenure, education, type of employment and unemployment status. All information is 
collected at the end of each quarter. The wage is reported as the nominal gross salary per 
month. To avoid a time trend of the dependent variable, we calculate the real gross salary per 
month by using the German Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices [Federal Statistical Office 
of Germany (2011a)]. The real wages were stationary between 2000 and 2007.
11
 The 
employment status is reported by the employer and is classified into four groups: unskilled 
blue-collar workers, skilled blue-collar workers, foremen and white-collar workers (the 
reference group). The job tenure is measured as an individual’s duration (in quarters) of 
employment at a given firm. Education level is classified into three groups: low-skilled, 
medium-skilled and high-skilled. Workers without vocational training are classified as low-
skilled, workers who have completed vocational training are classified as medium-skilled, and 
workers with academic degrees are classified as high-skilled employees. Skill level and 
employment status can differ, thus we use both. 
For the empirical estimation, we use the following firm-specific information: firm size, 
industry and the age structure of the employees. The firm size is classified into three groups. 
A small firm has less than 50 employees and a large firm has more than 200 employees. We 
use medium size firms, classified as having between 50 and 200 employees, as a reference 
group. We distinguish the following industries: construction, manufacturing, wholesale and 
retail trade, real estate, rental and business activities, transport, storage and communication 
and financial intermediation.
12
 The age structure of a firm is described by the share of older 
(>55 years of age) and younger (<20 years of age) employees. These variables are intended to 
                                                          
11
Since we observe a fixed number of time periods, we applied the Harris-Tzavalis test for stationarity [Harris 
and Tzavalis (1999)]. The non-stationarity hypothesis is only not discarded for low-and high-skilled women in 
Eastern and Western Germany in the Construction Industry. These two groups are too small to allow reliable test 
results. The use of alternative inflation data [BIP Deflator] does not change the results. 
12
 The industries follow the European national accounting system [Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2007)]. 
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absorb effects of the firms’ age structure. To account for the influence of business cycles, we 
include the industry-specific gross value added (real annual value, base year: 2000) [Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany (2010)] and dummy variables for each quarter. 
Because of structural differences in the labor markets, we divide the dataset into Eastern and 
Western Germany [see Kronthaler (2003) or Smolny (2009)]. This segmentation is based on 
job location. To avoid misreported wages in our analysis, we truncate our data at the 5
th
 
percentile and at the 95
th
 percentile. Moreover information about wages above the maximum 
level that must be reported for social insurance contributions are reported voluntarily and 
often missing. If the wage is not reported voluntarily, the maximum level for social insurance 
contributions is reported instead. Truncating the wages avoid these problems. After these 
restrictions, our sample still contains 136, 949 men and 49, 240 women in Western Germany 
and 25, 995 men and 17, 419 women in Eastern Germany.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
Theory predicts that the level of UA payments affects the wages. Wage bargaining models as 
well as search models predict, that a hike in the UA increases the outside option and therefore 
the wage [see Rogerson et al. (2005)]. Thus, the wage is a positive function of the UA. 
Therefore, decreasing the UA should decrease wages. The introduction of the means-tested, 
non-income related UA in 2005 is a quasi-natural experiment in which the UA decreases. The 
decrease of the UA weakens the worker’s outside option and decreases the worker’s 
bargaining power in individual or collective wage bargaining [see Rowthorn (1999)]. This 
may induce moderate wage claim.  
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Our estimation strategy is consistent with the idea of a structural break in the German labor 
market in 2005. We identify this structural break using a Chow-test.
13
 We do not detect a 
structural break for the shortening of short-term unemployment benefits entitlement periods in 
2006. We estimate the effect of introducing means-tested, non-income related UA payments 
on the real wage in 2005 using the following empirical model:
14
 
ln (𝑤)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑈𝐴𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑎𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡.   (3.1) 
The logarithmic value of the real wage 𝑤 of each employed individual 𝑖 in period 𝑡 is 
estimated with a constant 𝛽0, a time dummy variable to measure the effect of the lower UA 
(𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝐴𝑡), several control variables, a personal fixed effect 𝑎𝑖 and an error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡. The 
variable 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝐴 is equal to unity after 2005.  
Because the decreased UA payments affect all socially insured employees, it is not possible to 
identify a treatment and a control group to isolate the pure effect of the lower UA. 
Nevertheless, we are confident that the parameter 𝛽1 reveals the effect of the lower UA on 
wages for unemployed individuals. We are confident about this conclusion because we are 
able to isolate the effect of the 𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝐴 dummy variable by using a wide set of control 
variables and sensitivity tests. Our model controls for age, age squared, professional status, 
firm size, the firm’s age structure, individual job tenure, annual values of the industry-specific 
gross value added per worker and dummy variables for each quarter.
15
 The industry-specific 
gross value added and the dummy variables for each quarter are included to account for time 
                                                          
13
 To find additional support for the results of the Chow-test, we split our sample into two sub-samples: before 
(year 2003) and after the introduction (year 2007) of the means-tested UA payments. We exclude the period 
from 2004 to 2006 to avoid transition effects. The pooled regressions for both sub-samples show a significantly 
lower constant after the reform for everyone in the sample except for Eastern German men. The remaining 
coefficients are quite similar [See tables in the Appendix]. 
14
 Link tests [Pregibon (1980)] support the dependent variable in logarithmic values. Furthermore, it allows an 
analysis of the relative effect of the reform, regardless of income level. 
15
 We cover possible seasonal effects with dummy variables for each quarter other than the first quarter of the 
year.  
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fixed effects.
16
 In a balanced panel with a fixed effects model, the age variables account for a 
portion of the time trend effects.
17
 
Because we are interested in the variation in wages over time, we run individual fixed effect 
(FE) regressions. In a first step model, we estimate our empirical model separately for men 
and women in Eastern and Western Germany. This estimation gives a first impression of the 
effect of decreased UA payments on wages. In a second step model, we study skill-specific 
and industry-specific effects. Because of the information on skill, sex, industries and region 
for each worker does not vary over time, we estimate the model for men and women and the 
three skill levels for six different industries, according to the European national accounting 
system [see Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2007)] for Eastern and Western 
Germany.18 We only analyze industries with a share of more than 4 percent of all employees.19 
 
                                                          
16
We use the industry-specific gross value added instead of the unemployment rate because there are no data on 
industry specific unemployment in Germany.  
17
 To ensure that the lower UA dummy does not simply mirror decreasing wage returns to age, we estimate our 
model as a sensitivity test without the age variables. Our results remain stable and are robust to this model 
specification. As a further sensitivity test, we estimate placebo regressions with artificial reform variables. 
Instead of the variable lower UA, we introduced dummy variables for artificial reforms in every year except for 
2005.  After 2004, the effect of the artificial reform dummy variable becomes negative. This effect is quite small 
when compared to the negative effects observed in 2005, 2006 and 2007. This result supports the assumption 
that the wage-dampening effect of the Hartz reforms begins to occur in 2005. The results of the sensitivity tests 
can be found in the Appendix. 
18
 An aggregate estimation with dummy variable for each industry would be biased. By using a fixed effect 
estimation with dummy variables for the different industries, the coefficients of these dummy variables would be 
driven by the minority of inter-industrial mobile workers. Theory and empirics [Neal (1995)] show that inter-
industrial mobility is small.  
19
 Overall, the chosen six industries contain more than 96% of the working population in the private sector 
between 2000 and 2007 [Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2011b)]. 
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4.5 Results 
In this section, we provide evidence that the introduction of the decreased UA in 2005 leads to 
a decrease in wages. In Table 7, we first present the empirical evidence for men and women in 
Eastern and Western Germany, irrespective of industry and skill level. 
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Table 7: FE Estimation Results for Men and Women in Eastern and Western Germany 
 Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage)  men women men women 
Constant 7.1851*** 6.8753*** 7.1069*** 6.8522*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0154) (0.0233) (0.0314) 
Lower UA -0.0240*** -0.0259*** -0.0200*** -0.0271*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Age 0.0346*** 0.0400*** 0.0248*** 0.0303*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0013) 
Age
2
  -0.0004*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Unskilled blue collar worker -0.0759*** -0.0538*** -0.0858*** -0.0644*** 
 (0.0026) (0.0056) (0.0065) (0.0097) 
Skilled blue collar worker -0.0590*** -0.0407*** -0.0713*** -0.0605*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0089) 
Foreman 0.0036 0.0018 -0.0016 0.0289 
 (0.0036) (0.0167) (0.0101) (0.0206) 
Small firm -0.0240*** -0.0233*** -0.0201*** -0.0215*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0030) 
Large firm 0.0230*** 0.0211*** 0.0247*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0027) 
Firm’s share of  young employees -0.0129*** -0.0341*** 0.0139 0.0203* 
 (0.0042) (0.0064) (0.0093) (0.0116) 
Firm’s share of old employees -0.0123*** -0.0284*** -0.0209*** -0.0134* 
 (0.0030) (0.0049) (0.0063) (0.0073) 
Industrial-specific gross value added 0.0005*** 0.0002*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Job tenure 0.0014*** 0.0005*** 0.0016*** 0.0008*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
2
nd
 Quarter -0.0043*** -0.0040*** -0.0043*** -0.0040*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
3
rd
 Quarter -0.0088*** -0.0078*** -0.0092*** -0.0082*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
4
th
 Quarter -0.0101*** -0.0089*** -0.0094*** -0.0084*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
R
2 
(overall) 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.17 
R
2 
(within) 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.04 
obs. 4 064 672 1 403 530 728 539 491 444 
Industry-specific gross value added per worker is given annually.  
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Standard errors in parentheses.  
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For men and women in Eastern and Western Germany, we find a highly significant, negative 
effect of the lower UA variable. The estimated coefficients presented in Table 7 are the 
marginal effects. In Western Germany, the decreased UA variable ceteris paribus shows a 
2.4 % decrease in wages for men and a 2.6 % decrease in wages for women after 2005. In 
Eastern Germany, the effect is smaller for men (2.0 %), but higher for women (2.7 %). The 
negative coefficient of lower UA does not imply that wages decreased after 2005. The overall 
wage would only have decreased if all other variables would have remained constant in the 
absence of the Hartz reforms. The effect is higher for women in both parts of Germany. The 
absolute effect of the lower UA is stronger in Western Germany.
20
  
To allow a more detailed analysis, we now present the results for the skill-specific and 
industry-specific estimations. This study included 72 regressions in total. We estimate fixed 
effect regressions to identify the effect of the lower UA for men and women, six industries 
and three skill levels in Eastern and Western Germany. Table 8 and Table 9 present the 
marginal effect of the lower UA dummy variable with respect to the industry, skill and gender 
of the worker.  
  
                                                          
20
 In the Appendix, we present the estimation results for the dependent variable of wage in absolute values. 
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Table 8: Marginal Effects of Lower UA on the Logarithmic Wages with Respect to Industry, Gender and 
Skill Level in Western Germany  
 
Construction 
industry 
Manufacturing 
industry 
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade 
Real estate, 
renting and 
business 
activities 
Transport, 
storage and 
communication 
Financial 
intermediation 
  
Men 
   Low -0.0195*** -0.0158*** -0.0196*** -0.0289*** -0.0225*** -0.0240*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0009) (0.0028) (0.0044) (0.0026) (0.0071) 
R
2 
(within) 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.18 
Obs. 30,828 226,234 41,384 15,388 33,231 4,476 
Medium -0.0223*** -0.0166*** -0.0266*** -0.0266*** -0.0205*** -0.0287*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0012) 
R
2 
(within) 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.29 
Obs. 292,236 1,254,838 475,837 192,017 213,330 122,192 
High -0.0243*** -0.0276*** -0.0600*** -0.0432*** -0.0282*** -0.0411*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0007) (0.0033) (0.0015) (0.0047) (0.0021) 
R
2 
(within) 0.15 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.44 
Obs. 13,532 194,734 36,564 104,933 8,915 28,022 
 
  
Women 
   Low -0.0174 -0.0169*** -0.0283*** -0.0315*** -0.0139** -0.0130** 
 (0.0108) (0.0014) (0.0042) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0058) 
R
2 
(within) 0.14 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.11 
Obs. 1,097 82,843 18,914 6,502 4,613 6,394 
Medium -0.0103** -0.0150*** -0.0295*** -0.0283*** -0.0190*** -0.0247*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0018) 
R
2 
(within) 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.18 
Obs. 20,589 206,480 205,593 109,517 47,000 84,399 
High 0.0283 -0.0215*** -0.0454*** -0.0443*** -0.0110 -0.0406*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0043) (0.0073) (0.0058) (0.0157) (0.0072) 
R
2 
(within) 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.12 
Obs. 1,594 20,417 11,030 21,302 2,836 8,252 
Dependent variable: ln(wage) 
Controls: age, age
2
, professional status, firm-size, firm´s age structure, industry-specific gross value added per 
worker, job tenure, quarter dummies 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Standard errors in parentheses.  
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In every industry, for nearly all skill levels and for both genders, we confirm the highly 
significant negative coefficients of the general estimations for Western Germany [see Table 
8]. For the largest subsample of medium-skilled men in the manufacturing industry in 
Western Germany, the marginal effect of lower UA is -1.7 %, ceteris paribus. After 
controlling for the industry-specific effect, there is no clear evidence whether the effect of the 
lower UA is stronger for men or women. In many industries, for both men and women, the 
effect of the lower UA increases with the worker’s skill level. The higher effect for high-
skilled workers may be driven by a stronger decrease of the UA level. Recall that after 2005, 
the level of the UA is independent from the individual’s wage. After 2005, the lower fixed 
levels of UA payments significantly weaken the fallback position of highly qualified workers. 
 
Bargaining theory predicts that the effect differs with the grad of unionization. The 
differences between industries are not systematic. For the construction and manufacturing 
industry, as well as for transport, storage and communications, the effect is smaller in contrast 
to the effect on the wholesale and retail trade industry, the real estate industry, the rental and 
business activities industry, as well as to the financial intermediation industry. More powerful 
unions may be the reason for that. 
In Eastern Germany, the lower UA has a significant negative effect, but the effect is smaller 
than in Western Germany. For medium-skilled men in the manufacturing industry, the effect 
of the lower UA on wages is only 1.3 %. In contrast to Western Germany, we do not observe 
any clear pattern in the effects of the lower UA with respect to gender, skill and industry. 
Accounting for an industry-specific effect, we find no systematic difference between the 
effects on men and women. Furthermore, the level of the effect is detached from the skill 
level. In this regression, is also impossible to identify an industry-specific pattern [see Table 
9].  
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Table 9: Marginal Effects of Lower UA on the Logarithmic Wages with Respect to Industry, Gender and 
Skill Level in Eastern Germany 
 
Construction 
industry 
Manufacturing 
industry 
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade 
Real estate, 
renting and 
business 
activities 
Transport, 
storage and 
communication 
Financial 
intermediation 
  
Men 
   Low -0.00656 -0.0123* -0.00300 -0.0143 -0.0238*** -0.0160 
 (0.0125) (0.0067) (0.0075) (0.0115) (0.0060) (0.0348) 
R
2 
(within) 0.122 0.064 0.120 0.085 0.155 0.484 
Obs. 2,183 7,250 2,541 1,373 3,235 210 
Medium -0.0139*** -0.0125*** -0.0128*** -0.0197*** -0.0232*** -0.0232*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0050) 
R
2 
(within) 0.051 0.094 0.060 0.047 0.047 0.358 
Obs. 101,932 160,340 84,415 36,364 67,524 7,873 
High -0.0326*** -0.0099*** -0.0132* -0.0136*** -0.0126* -0.0120 
 (0.0097) (0.0031) (0.0071) (0.0050) (0.0074) (0.0086) 
R
2 
(within) 0.123 0.218 0.100 0.099 0.215 0.227 
Obs. 4,660 21,132 4,906 15,551 2,734 2,688 
 
  
Women 
   Low 0.0249 -0.0152* -0.0183* -0.0268** -0.0446** -0.0159 
 (0.0430) (0.0083) (0.0107) (0.0133) (0.0173) (0.0133) 
R
2 
(within) 0.31 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.21 
Obs. 199 4,325 1,533 896 838 398 
Medium -0.00801 -0.0139*** -0.0133*** -0.0222*** -0.0230*** -0.0120*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0034) 
R
2 
(within) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.11 0.11 
Obs. 8,017 47,793 51,296 32,149 22,618 16,880 
High -0.0503*** -0.0142** -0.0135* -0.0069 -0.0508*** -0.0118 
 (0.0185) (0.0061) (0.0080) (0.0076) (0.0181) (0.0083) 
R
2 
(within) 0.05 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.17 
Obs. 1,481 7,362 3,634 8,617 1,441 2,842 
Dependent variable: ln(wage) 
Controls: age, age
2
, professional status, firm-size, firm´s age structure, industry-specific gross value added per 
worker, job tenure, quarter dummies 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Standard errors in parentheses.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
Theory predicts that decreased amounts of UC should result in decreased wages. Using a 2% 
sample of all socially insured, full time employees in Germany, we find strong evidence that 
decreasing the amount of the UA results in decreased wages in Germany. As a new approach, 
we use micro panel data to examine the structural break in the German labor market that 
occurred in 2005 as a result of the Hartz-IV reform. This legislative reform of the labor 
market decreased the UA and was therefore a unique natural experiment. Prior to 2005, UA 
payments were calculated as a fraction of the individual’s former wage. Beginning in 2005, 
the UA was distributed as a fixed, means-tested payment. Thus, the overall level of the UA 
decreased. Our findings show that the decrease in the UA has a negative effect on wages, 
ceteris paribus. In Western Germany, the effect is -2.4% for men and -2.6% for women, and 
the effect is -2.0% and -2.7% for men and women in Eastern Germany, respectively.
 21
 Our 
results amend previous findings that show a restraint effect of the Hartz–IV reform on the 
concession willingness of applicants [e.g., Rebien and Kettner (2011)]. We can show that the 
reform does not only affects new applicants but rather the whole wage structure. Furthermore, 
in Western Germany, the marginal effect of the decreased UA is higher at higher skill levels; 
this finding holds for both men and women. The increasing gap between former wage and UA 
can explain these findings. The industry-specific effect is often higher for men. In Eastern 
Germany, we do not detect a systematic, industry-specific difference between men and 
women, nor do we find a clear increase in the UA effect at increasing skill levels.  
Besides the strong worldwide demand for German products, the negative wage effect of the 
Hartz-IV reform may also be responsible for the favorable labor market situation in Germany 
[German Council of Economic Experts (2011)]. The decreased amount of UA available 
weakens the bargaining position of workers and collective bargaining units, thereby 
                                                          
21
 In addition the Hartz-IV reform also increases the flexibility of the German labor market. An increasing 
flexibilization affects the lay-off risk of employees and therefore the wages [see e.g. Arent and Nagl (2011)]. 
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weakening their wage claim amounts. More moderate wage agreements may explain the 
German economy’s increased competitiveness after 2005. Moderate wage settings because of 
labor market deregulation can improve the situation for capital investments and increase the 
competitiveness of the economy [see Spector (2004)]. Capital investments become more 
attractive because the negative wage effect of the Hartz-IV reform reallocates profits to the 
capital owner. Future empirical research has to examine the possible increasing of 
employment and investments because of the labor market deregulation (decrease of the UA 
and flexibilization) in detail. In addition to bargaining models, our findings are also consistent 
with effects that would be predicted from a neo-classical labor market. A decreased UA 
decreases the implicit minimum wage, which leads to higher employment (decreased 
unemployment) that is accompanied by decreased wages. 
Current studies support the positive employment effect. These studies show that the reform 
has increased the labor market’s matching efficiency [Klinger and Rothe (2012)] and has 
reduced unemployment and the duration of individuals’ unemployment periods [Krause and 
Uhlig (2011)]. Data from the German Federal Employment Agency (2012) show that the 
number of unemployed individuals and the unemployment rate decreased significantly after 
2005. This finding also holds for long-term unemployed individuals, whose share of total 
unemployed individuals decreased from 46% in 2007 to less than 35% in 2010. At the same 
time, the rate of socially secured employment increased even during the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis. Moreover, current research [Koller (2011)] suggests that the effect of an increasing 
low-wage labor market, which is often subject to criticism in the public sphere of debate, is 
small (Western Germany) or nonexistent (Eastern Germany). To assess the welfare effects of 
the Hartz-IV reform, a joint analysis of the wage effect and the employment effect is needed. 
Future research should focus on both effects and their interaction effects to derive reliable 
political recommendations.   
4 Unemployment Compensation and Wages: Evidence from the German Hartz-Reform 
 
84 
 
4.7 References 
 
Arent, S. and Nagl, W. (2011), The Price of Security: On the Causality and Impact of Lay-off 
Risks on Wages, ifo Working Paper No. 100. 
Addisson, J. T., Centeno; M. and Portugal, P. (2009), Do Reservation Wages Really Decline? 
Some International Evidence on the Determinants of Reservation Wages. Journal of Labor 
Research 30, 1-8. 
Ebbinghaus, B. and Eichhorst, W. (2006), Employment Regulation and Labor Market Policy 
in Germany, 1991-2005. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2505.  
Federal Employment Office of Germany (2012), Number of Unemployed and the 
Unemployment rate, http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Navigation/Statistik/Statistik-nach-
Themen/Statistik-nach-Themen-Nav.html , retrieved 15.06.2012, 14:10 h. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2007), Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen 
Inlandsprodukt nach ESVG 1995 – Methoden und Grundlagen. Fachserie 18 Reihe S.22, 
Wiesbaden. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2010), Gross domestic product, gross value added in 
Germany by Bundesland and East-West-Regions 1991 to 2009. Reihe 1, Band 1, 
Wiesbaden. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2011a), German Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices, https://www-genesis.destatis.de, retrieved 28.03.2011, 15:12 h. 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2011b), Compensation of employees, gross wages and 
salaries in Germany by Bundesland and East-West-Regions 1991 to 2010. Reihe 1, Band 2, 
Wiesbaden. 
4 Unemployment Compensation and Wages: Evidence from the German Hartz-Reform 
 
85 
 
Feldstein, M. and Poterba, J. (1984), Unemployment Insurance and Reservation' Wages. 
Journal of Public Economics 23, 141-167. 
German Council of Economic Experts (2011), Assume responsibility for Europe – Annual 
Report 2011/12, Federal Statistical Office of Germany, Wiesbaden. 
Harris, R. D. F. and Tzavalis, E. (1999), Inference for unit roots in dynamic panels where the 
time dimension is fixed. Journal of Econometrics 91, 201-226. 
Jacobi, L. and Kluve, J. (2007), Before and After the Hartz Reforms: The Performance of 
Active Labour Market Policy in Germany. Journal of Labour Market Research 40 (1), 45-
64. 
Klinger, S. and Rothe, T. (2012), The Impact of Labour Market Reforms and Economic 
Performance on the Matching of the Short‐term and the Long‐term Unemployed. Scottish 
Journal of Political Economy 59 (1), 90-114. 
Koller, L. (2011), Hartz IV und der Niedriglohnsektor – Bei vielen bleibt das Stück vom 
Kuchen gleich. IAB-Forum 1/2011, 34-39. 
Krause, M. U. and Uhlig, H. (2011), Transitions in the German labor market: structure and 
crisis. Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, No 34/2011, 1-37.  
Kronthaler, F. (2003), A Study of the Competitiveness of Regions based on a Cluster 
Analysis: The Example of Eastern Germany. IWH-Discussion-Paper, No. 179, 1-21. 
McCall, B. and Chi, W. (2008), Unemployment insurance, unemployment durations and re-
employment wages. Economics Letters 99, 115-118. 
Neal, D. (1995), Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from Displaced Workers. 
Journal of Labor Economics 13 (4), 653-677. 
4 Unemployment Compensation and Wages: Evidence from the German Hartz-Reform 
 
86 
 
Pregibon, D. (1980), Goodness of link tests for generalized linear models. Applied Statistics 
29, 15-24. 
Rebien, M. and Kettner, A. (2011), Die Konzessionsbereitschaft von Bewerbern und 
Beschäftigten nach den Hartz-Reformen. WSI Mitteilungen 5/2011, 218-225. 
Rogerson, R., Shimer, R. and Wright, R. (2005), Search-Theoretic Models of the Labor 
Market: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature 18, 959-988. 
Rowthorn, R. (1999), Unemployment, wage bargaining and capital-labour substitution, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 23 (4), 413-425. 
Schmucker, A., Seth S. (2009), BA-Employment-Panel, 1998-2007, Codebook, FDZ 
Datenreport 1/2009, 1-123. 
Smolny, W. (2009), Wage Adjustment, Competitiveness and Unemployment - Eastern 
Germany after Unification. Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 229, 130-145. 
Schulte, J. (2004), Arbeitslosengeld II und Arbeitslosenhilfe: Gewinner und Verlierer – Eine 
Schätzung der Nettoeinkommenseffekte von Hartz IV, Diskussionsbeiträge des 
Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin - Volkswirtschaftliche 
Reihe Nr. 2004/29, 1-18. 
Spector, D. (2004), Competition and the capital–labor conflict, European Economic Review 
48 (1), 25–38. 
Topel, R. H. (1984), Equilibrium Earnings, Turnover, and Unemployment: New Evidence. 
Journal of Labor Economics 2(4), 500-522. 
 
4 Unemployment Compensation and Wages: Evidence from the German Hartz-Reform 
 
87 
 
4.8 Data 
 
Federal employment agency of Germany (2008), BA-Employment Panel 1998-2007, 
Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency of Germany (BA) at the 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg.  
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4.9 Appendix 
Table 10: Pooled estimations before and after the reform in Western Germany 
 
Men (before) Men (after) Woman (before) Women (after) 
Constant 
1,764*** 819.6*** 2,047*** 393.8*** 
 
(31.94) (27.92) (45.89) (44.55) 
Age 
92.98*** 81.97*** 114.1*** 98.89*** 
 
(1.01) (1.14) (1.48) (1. 80) 
Age
2
 
-0.94*** -0.82*** -1.25*** -1.04*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Unskilled blue  
-1,242*** -1,261*** -888.9*** -862.7*** 
collar worker 
(2.41) (2.43) (3.52) (4.01) 
Skilled blue collar  
-933.3*** -938.3*** -553.5*** -565.5*** 
worker 
(2.39) (2.47) (6.65) (6.92) 
Foreman 
-105.1*** -134.2*** -52.06 27.77 
 
(6.150) (6.254) (35.33) (38.68) 
Small firm 
-197.5*** -185.3*** -258.2*** -264.1*** 
 
(2.74) (2.88) (4.41) (4.79) 
Large firm 
342.8*** 332.7*** 302.4*** 307.6*** 
 
(2.49) (2.57) (4.24) (4.52) 
Firm’s share of  
-1,365*** -1,561*** -1,930*** -2,380*** 
young employees 
(19.13) (21.75) (29.79) (36.71) 
Firm’s share of  
-208.7*** -336.4*** -345.0*** -458.9*** 
old employees 
(12.29) (11.71) (19.79) (18.51) 
Industrial-specific  
-3.62*** 6.89*** -16.05*** 1.98*** 
gross value added 
(0.24) (0.093) (0.36) (0.20) 
Job tenure 
5.13*** 3.55*** -5.90*** -2.85*** 
 
(0.26) (0.11) (0.48) (0.21) 
2
nd
 Quarter 
3.52 -19.63*** 11.18** -17.49*** 
 
(2.75) (2.82) (4.69) (5.08) 
3
rd
 Quarter 
2.19 -24.99*** 22.61*** -12.31** 
 
(2.77) (2.82) (4.75) (5.08) 
4
th
 Quarter 
5.67** -52.27*** 37.24*** -29.00*** 
 
(2.83) (2.82) (4.86) (5.09) 
R
2
 0.46 0.46 0.29 0.25 
Obs. 510,599 492,257 177,287 168,908 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1 Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  
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Table 11: Pooled estimations before and after the reform in Eastern Germany 
 
Men (before) Men (after) Woman (before) Women (after) 
Constant 
1,118*** 1,313*** 372.7*** -32.22 
 
(43.91) (52.92) (58.85) (69.75) 
Age 
55.41*** 44.16*** 85.26*** 88.70*** 
 
(1.80) (2.31) (2.39) (3.05) 
Age
2
 
-0.61*** -0.45*** -0.91*** -0.89*** 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Unskilled blue collar worker 
-787.2*** -992.6*** -696.5*** -771.3*** 
 
(5.96) (6.31) (7.05) (7.85) 
Skilled blue collar worker 
-727.2*** -898.3*** -590.8*** -627.6*** 
 
(4.91) (5.38) (6.81) (7.54) 
Foreman 
-161.9*** -260.2*** -123.2*** -148.1*** 
 
(13.75) (15.89) (43.46) (48.72) 
Small firm 
-196.1*** -167.6*** -294.4*** -311.8*** 
 
(4.39) (4.88) (6.57) (7.14) 
Large firm 
307.3*** 333.3*** 293.1*** 240.8*** 
 
(5.05) (5.48) (6.01) (6.57) 
Firm’s share of  young employees 
-944.4*** -1,066*** -1,383*** -1,729*** 
 
(31.20) (42.06) (37.75) (46.35) 
Firm’s share of old employees 
-125.1*** -142.3*** -14.05 10.52 
 
(20.61) (19.95) (25.23) (24.87) 
Industrial-specific gross value added 
1.64*** 2.52*** -0.13 2.11*** 
 
(0.22) (0.10) (0.32) (0.16) 
Job tenure 
13.70*** 7.18*** 1.13 0.028 
 
(0.44) (0.20) (0.69) (0.28) 
2
nd
 Quarter 
-7.92 -22.76*** 2.58 -20.54*** 
 
(5.14) (5.77) (6.71) (7.54) 
3
rd
 Quarter 
-19.65*** -29.99*** 4.71 -22.08*** 
 
(5.17) (5.78) (6.79) (7.54) 
4
th
 Quarter 
-19.39*** -51.11*** 15.91** -40.44*** 
 
(5.32) (5.81) (6.98) (7.55) 
R
2
 0.39 0.42 0.31 0. 26 
Obs. 89,265 89,297 61,444 59,867 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*).Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  
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Table 12: FE estimation Results for Men and Women in Eastern and Western Germany without Age 
Variables 
 Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Dependent Variable: ln Wage men women men women 
Constant 7.9260*** 7.762*** 7.599*** 7.549*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0057) (0.0061) (0.0072) 
Lower UA -0.0180*** -0.0121*** -0.0219*** -0.0189*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
Unskilled blue collar worker -0.0840*** -0.0541*** -0.0916*** -0.0655*** 
 (0.00259) (0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0097) 
Skilled blue collar worker -0.0690*** -0.0447*** -0.0776*** -0.0611*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0089) 
Foreman 0.0032 0.0035 -0.0012 0.0365* 
 (0.0037) (0.0166) (0.0101) (0.0212) 
Small firm -0.0253*** -0.0247*** -0.0210*** -0.0217*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0031) 
Large firm 0.0238*** 0.0217*** 0.0257*** 0.0128*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0027) 
Firm’s share of  young employees -0.0371*** -0.0633*** 0.0019 0.0065 
 (0.0043) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0117) 
Firm’s share of old employees -0.0317*** -0.0523*** -0.0396*** -0.0289*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0050) (0.0063) (0.0073) 
Industrial-specific gross value added 0.0007*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Job tenure 0.0017*** 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
2
nd
 Quarter -0.0041*** -0.0037*** -0.0043*** -0.0039*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
3
rd
 Quarter -0.0082*** -0.0072*** -0.0091*** -0.0079*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
4
th
 Quarter -0.0091*** -0.00735*** -0.0094*** -0.0075*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
R
2 
(overall) 0.33 0.11 0.31 0.17 
R
2 
(within) 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02 
obs. 4,064,672 1,403,530 728,539 491,444 
The industry-specific gross value added is given annually. The result of this specification is equivalent to use of 
year dummy variables. 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 13: Artificial Reforms Estimations 
Dependent Variable: 
ln(wage) 
2001 and 
later 
2002 and 
later 
2003 and 
later 
2004 and 
later 
2005 and 
later 
2006 and 
later 
2007 and 
later 
Western 
Germany 
Men 
0.0168*** 0.0213*** 0.0266*** -0.0080*** -0.0240*** -0.0204*** -0.0153*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Women 
0.0278*** 0.0306*** 0.0248*** -0.0087*** -0.0259*** -0.0280*** -0.0266*** 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Eastern 
Germany 
Men 
0.0141*** 0.0170*** 0.0132*** -0.0114*** -0.0200*** -0.0134*** -0.0074*** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Women 
0.0283*** 0.0321*** 0.0241*** -0.0100*** -0.0271*** -0.0285*** -0.0226*** 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 14: FE Estimation Results for Men and Women in Eastern and Western Germany 
Dependent Variable: Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Wage in € men women men women 
Constant 524.7*** 69.58* 898.1*** 365.2*** 
L (25.64) (39.79) (47.94) (62.94) 
lower UA -74.18*** -63.39*** -40.81*** -56.43*** 
 (0.72) (1.16) (1.31) (1.51) 
Age 103.7*** 104.2*** 54.84*** 67.35*** 
 (1.03) (1.54) (1.96) (2.52) 
Age
2
  -1.02*** -1.00*** -0.60*** -0.63*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Unskilled blue collar  -205.0*** -117.6*** -171.3*** -110.5*** 
worker (6.73) (11.90) (12.68) (15.94) 
Skilled blue collar  -166.2*** -86.08*** -148.4*** -107.0*** 
worker (6.341) (13.40) (11.84) (14.98) 
Foreman 15.65 0.17 -1.25 52.83 
 (10.90) (39.67) (22.13) (39.65) 
Small Firm -61.28*** -51.27*** -37.24*** -34.00*** 
 (2.56) (4.48) (4.13) (6.07) 
Large Firm 57.91*** 48.82*** 47.88*** 22.13*** 
 (2.61) (4.27) (5.32) (5.67) 
Firm’s share of young  -21.55** -66.53*** 34.36* 46.45** 
employees (10.91) (14.94) (18.07) (21.61) 
Firm’s share of old  -61.69*** -80.16*** -47.99*** -35.11** 
employees (8.17) (11.97) (12.58) (14.49) 
Industrial-specific  1.21*** 0.41*** 1.02*** 1.19*** 
gross value added (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.14) 
Job Tenure 3.31*** 0.94*** 3.09*** 1.42*** 
 (0.11) (0.19) (0.19) (0.25) 
2
nd
 quarter -13.94*** -10.33*** -9.570*** -8.582*** 
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.23) (0.27) 
3
rd
 quarter -28.20*** -20.35*** -20.26*** -17.45*** 
 (0.19) (0.30) (0.35) (0.41) 
4
th
 quarter -33.58*** -23.47*** -20.20*** -17.43*** 
 (0.24) (0.38) (0.43) (0.51) 
R
2
 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 
obs. 4,064,672 1,403,530 728,539 491,444 
The industry-specific gross value added is given annually. The result of this specification is equivalent to use of 
year dummy variables. 
Source: authors’ calculation. Significance-level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses
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5 Expectations and Saving Behavior: An Empirical 
Analysis
1
 
by Stefan Arent 
 
5.1 Introduction 
According to the intertemporal consumption smoothing motive, people want to smooth their 
consumption over their lifetimes by saving. Therefore, expectations regarding their future 
income levels influence the saving decisions of both individuals and households [Aaron 
(1999)]. Economic research has addressed this empirical question since the 1990s [e.g., 
Browning and Lusardi (1996), Guiso et. al. (2002), Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000)]. Both short-
term and long-term uncertainties can affect households’ expected incomes and therefore their 
savings. In the short term, households are faced with income uncertainty because of the risk of 
becoming unemployed; in the long term, a householder’s health and retirement situation may 
be unknown. Hence, households save a share of their current income to ensure their future 
consumption. The scope of the previous empirical studies on intertemporal consumption 
smoothing is limited; furthermore, the evidence is mixed [see Browning and Lusardi (1996)]. 
The “mixed results of these studies may be at least partially attributable to the difficulty in 
calculating an exogenous measure” for future income uncertainty [Engen and Gruber (2001) 
p. 550]. At best, one would like to link information about the savings today with the 
expectations about income. 
To date, the impact of (income) expectations on saving behavior has only been examined by a 
small number of studies. This paucity of research is due to the limited availability of data that 
contain microeconomic information regarding both individual expectations and saving 
behavior. Exceptions include the panel studies by Guiso et al. (2002) or Jappelli and Pistaferri 
                                                          
1
 An older version of this chapter is available as "Expectations and Saving Behavior: An Empirical Analysis" as 
ifo Working Paper Nr. 128. 
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(2000), which find no clear evidence for any effect of individual expectations concerning 
future income on the savings of Italian households. In contrast to these studies, the focus of 
this chapter is the variation of individual (income) expectations and their impact on savings. 
While former studies about the linkage of expectation and savings bases on cross section 
analyses, we use German panel data for this purpose. The expectations about future income 
are the most important factors for the saving decision. Moreover individuals should adjust 
their savings if their expectations vary. This relationship can only be studied using panel data 
in which we can observe households over time. Moreover, whereas the panel studies that were 
mentioned above neglected interaction effects, we consider these effects.
2
 We research the 
issue of an individual’s income expectation affects his saving decision in a panel study. 
Using the German SAVE panel [Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (2011)], we 
examine intertemporal consumption smoothing, and we focus on the future income 
expectation. A simple intertemporal consumption smoothing model predicts that the higher 
the future income the lower the savings [e.g. Friedman (1957)] and vice versa. We can amend 
this by income expectations: the higher the future income expectation the lower the savings. 
Therefore, we analyze the impact of income expectation on how much a household saves. 
Although we are unable to identify a clear impact of a higher income expectation on savings, 
we find evidence for a negative effect of increased unemployment expectation on savings 
(note that a higher unemployment expectation is equivalent to a lower income expectation). 
Moreover, whereas we find a positive effect of the health expectation on savings in Western 
Germany, we find that this effect is negative in Eastern Germany. The reminder of this 
chapter is organized as follows: in section 5.2, we will give a brief introduction of the 
theoretical literature on household saving decisions. Section 5.3 describes the dataset, and 
                                                          
2
 Moreover, we consider the effect of a current household’s situation. This consideration is necessary because the 
current situation of a household (for example, the health situation of its members) may affect the impact of the 
expectation (i.e., the income expectation) on the saving decision. 
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section 5.4 describes the estimation strategy. The empirical evidence is presented in section 
5.5, and in section 5.6, we summarize the results and discuss the findings. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Discussion 
This section presents a simplified modification of an intertemporal consumption textbook 
model [such as the one in Friedman (1957)]. Subsequently, we will use a modification of this 
framework to formulate a testable hypothesis. Consider an individual who wants to maximize 
his utility over two periods, and assume that the individual can save money to transfer income 
into the second period.
3
 The optimal level of savings (𝑠) is given by the maximization of the 
time-additive lifetime utility:
4
 
max𝑠 𝑢(𝑦0 − 𝑠) + 𝑢(𝑦1 + 𝑠(1 + 𝑟)).    (5.1) 
In the first period, the individual saves (𝑠) for the second period. The first period income is 
𝑦0. The interest rate (𝑟) is certain, and in the second period, the individual consumes both the 
second period’s income and his savings.
5
 The Euler equation follows from the maximization 
of equation (1), which yields the common result of the equal marginal utility of consumption 
in both periods: 
𝑢′(𝑦0 − 𝑠) = (1 + 𝑟)𝑢′(𝑦1 + 𝑠(1 + 𝑟)).    (5.2) 
Using this framework, it is easy to show that a lower second period income must be 
compensated by increasing savings (i.e., a higher saving rate) to equal marginal utilities. Now, 
consider the case of unknown second-period income, but individuals reckon with certain 
estimation about their mean of the future labor income 𝐸(𝑦1̃) to optimize their savings. 
                                                          
3
 The borrowing constraint is binding; thus, debt is excluded in this framework and 𝑠 ≥ 0. 
4
 To ease the setting, we exclude time preferences. 
5
 If we normalize the income to unity, we can interpret the savings as the saving rate. 
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Hence, we examine whether the individuals smooth their intertemporal consumption with 
respect to their individual estimation of future income. Individual lifetime utility becomes the 
following function: 
𝑈(𝑠) = 𝑢(𝑦0 − 𝑠) + 𝑢(𝐸(𝑦1̃) + 𝑠(1 + 𝑟)).    (5.3) 
The Euler condition is modified to 
𝑢′(𝑦0 − 𝑠) = (1 + 𝑟)𝑢′(𝐸(𝑦1̃) + 𝑠(1 + 𝑟)) ,   (5.4) 
and it must hold to maximize lifetime utility. Thus, savings (or the optimal saving rate) must 
increase whenever individuals expect a lower second-period labor income [𝐸(𝑦1̃)]. Using the 
result of this model, we can formulate the following simple hypothesis. 
The Income Expectation Hypothesis (IEH) 
In a two-period model, if an individual certainly reckons with increasing future (labor) 
income, it will decrease its savings (i.e., its saving rate) until marginal utility of consumption 
of the present period equals the marginal utility of the future period. 
We will examine the impact of a household’s income and unemployment expectation on its 
savings. We use the German SAVE dataset to test the income expectation hypothesis (IEH).
6
 
At this point, it should again be expressly understood that the IEH is a very simplified model 
in which uncertainty (in sense of variance) about the future income is neglected. The given 
data contain only information about changes of the mean expectation, not about the variance. 
Nevertheless variance of future income is important for the saving decision. Because of risk 
aversion individuals adjust their savings not only with respect to the mean of future income 
                                                          
6
 Because the health of an individual may also affect his saving behavior, we also consider the impact of the 
health expectation on savings. There is only a very small strand of literature that analyzes the effect of health 
(i.e. mortality) on savings [e.g., Hurd (1989)]. 
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but also with respect to the variance [see Leland (1968) or Sandmo (1970)]. „Uncertainty 
about future income will reduce current consumption and increase current savings“ [see 
Kimball (1990) p. 68], the (strength of the) effect depends on the convexity of the utility 
function [see Kimball (1990)]. One should therefore keep in mind, that prudence also affects 
the savings decision (precautionary savings). Therefore households may increase their savings 
because of the uncertainty (precautionary savings) of their future income, even if the mean 
future income increase [Mastrogiacomo and Alessie (2013)]. Due to missing information 
about the variance of future income expectation we assume a certain future income 
expectation. Hence the rationale of precautionary savings is fading out. The IEH holds true in 
the case of certain expectations and in the case of risk neutral preferences.
7
 In the following 
the future income expectation is assumed to be certain. 
 
5.3 Data 
This section briefly presents the German SAVE dataset, which was compiled by the Munich 
Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA). This dataset is a survey panel that contains data 
pertaining to the saving behavior of German households. The annual survey began in 2005, 
and the period from 2005 to 2009 will be used in our empirical analysis. One of the main 
features of the SAVE panel is the possibility to observe the dynamics of the saving behavior 
of German households. The sample size differs between 2,222 households in the year 2009 
and 3,474 in 2006; 1,351 households were observed continuously between 2005 and 2009. 
The SAVE dataset is designed to be representative of the German population [see Börsch-
Supan et al. (2009)]. 
                                                          
7
 Nevertheless empirical results show evidence that the precautionary savings motive affects the saving rate [see 
Mastrogiacomo and Alessie (2013)]. 
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The survey contains detailed information regarding individual assets and expectations, which 
are necessary to examine the income expectation hypothesis. In addition to general socio-
economic information, such as the number of persons in each household, their ages, their 
marital status, their genders, the number of children, their skill levels  and their employment 
statuses, the dataset also contains detailed information about the saving behavior, the financial 
situation and the expectations of the household members. The information concerning the 
saving behavior is notably detailed. In addition to savings and financial wealth (in €), the 
dataset also contains information about the reasons that households are saving (e.g., to 
accumulate deposits to consume or to make a provision for old age). Among other things, the 
SAVE panel contains financial household data regarding the labor income (and its distribution 
between the household members), credits, inheritances, financial gains (e.g., from the lottery), 
real estate wealth and tax refunds, which may also affect the saving behavior. Additionally, 
we add the savings (flow) by calculating the difference between the asset stocks of two 
periods. The asset stock is calculated net of liabilities. Furthermore, we can distinguish 
different types of investment, namely, short-term, medium-term and long-term investments. 
Whereas short-term savings are in, e.g., savings accounts, stocks and shares are types of 
medium-term savings and life insurance and building loan contracts are long-term savings.
8
 
Table 15 presents the summary statistics of the households in the dataset corresponding to the 
period 2005-2009. 
                                                          
8
 These terms are related to the temporal horizon of the investment, meaning how long it takes for the investment 
to mature. 
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Table 15: Summary Statistics of the Households [the SAVE Dataset (2005-2009)] 
 Western Germany Eastern Germany 
Total Households 2 932 1 009 
Average Quantity of Children* 2.21 2.26 
Real Estate Owner 
Low-Skilled (Respondent) 
Medium-Skilled (Respondent) 
60.75% 
14.22% 
63.13% 
43.01% 
7.92% 
66.40% 
High-Skilled (Respondent) 19.51% 23.98% 
Average Household Net-Income in € 2 477.88 1 875.68 
Average Annual Savings in € 6 960.38 3 093.58 
Source: The author´s calculations. * If the household has at least one child. 
One of the most important features of the SAVE panel is that it contains variables that 
measure the surveyed households’ expectations. Furthermore, this panel contains income and 
employment data, as well as the health expectations. Moreover, the current situation of the 
household members is also captured. To the best of our knowledge, only the SAVE panel 
provides this information (in a panel dataset). 
For example, the households are asked to judge the likelihood of an increase in their income 
in the next year, as well as the probability of becoming unemployed [see Börsch-Supan et al. 
(2009) p. 21].
9
 Furthermore, the dataset contains valuations of the households’ current health 
and economic situations. The range of the expectations and situation values is between 0 and 
100 (in ten-point increments). Whereas a value of zero means that the household member has 
a negative expectation or situation and he believes that there is a 0% chance that his income 
will increase in the next year. A value of 100 represents a very positive situation or 
                                                          
9
 We interpret the income expectation as a permanent effect, a temporary effect is also possible (e.g. because of 
job change). 
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expectation.
10
 Conversely, the interpretation of the unemployment expectation is exactly 
contrary: if a respondent is certain that he will be unemployed, the value becomes 100.  
The future health expectation is calculated indirectly and in the following way: the households 
were asked if they expect to live longer (3), equally long (2) or shorter (1) than comparable 
persons in their age groups. If a person chose “longer,” we can assume that this person has a 
better health expectation than others. Thus, we create a dummy variable that is one if the 
questioned member of the household expects a good future health situation (3) and zero 
otherwise (i.e., when the given answers are either 1 or 2). 
All information is household-based. Thus, we calculate a household’s expectation using the 
data collected from the household’s members. In the cases of unemployment and income, the 
individual share of the household expectations is equal to the income share of each member of 
the household. We weighted the values thusly because we assume that the impact of an 
individual’s expectation on the household savings decision is more important if this member 
of the household has a larger share of the household income. For the health expectation of the 
household, we calculate a dummy variable using the dummy variables of the household 
members (mentioned above). As before, we weighted the individual health expectation 
(dummy variable) of the members of the household by their incomes. The household health 
expectation is good (1) if the income weighted variable is greater than one.
11
 
5.4 Empirical Strategy 
This section presents the empirical estimation strategy. The theory predicts a negative impact 
from an increasing labor income expectation on savings. We develop a regression model that 
                                                          
10
 If the householder expects for sure an increasing income within the next 5 years the variable is 100. The 
income situation is rated on the same scale. A value of 100 means a very good income situation of the 
householder. 
11
 The health situation is given by a variable between 0 and 100 (in ten-point increments), whereas a value of 100 
means a very good health situation. The household health situation was calculated by using the income weighted 
health situations of the household members. 
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is based on the income expectation hypothesis (IEH). The following equation represents our 
panel regression model
12
: 
𝑘𝑖𝑡(𝑗) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑠𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (+𝑎𝑖).   (5.5) 
A household (with a subscript 𝑖) has a savings rate13 (𝑘) in period 𝑡, which is explained by a 
constant (𝛽0), the income expectation or the unemployment expectation (𝑠𝑦) and a set of 
control variables; furthermore, there is an error term.
14
 For each household, we calculate the 
household expectation variables.
15
 The weight of each householder depends on her/his share 
of the household’s net income. The control variables are as follows: the future health 
expectation, the current health situation, inheritances and wins (e.g. lottery) (as a share of the 
income), a dummy variable for real estate ownership
16
, age and age squared, the number of 
children, the household’s overall skill level, a negative health expectation variable
17
 and 
yearly dummy variables. 
To conduct a sensitivity analysis, we add several interaction terms to the control variables 
because it is possible that the health situations as well as the health expectations of the 
householders affect the impact of the income/unemployment/health expectations on savings. 
                                                          
12
 The results that were obtained from a pooled regression estimation are similar to the results obtained using 
panel regression methods. 
13
 The saving rate is calculated as the share of the household’s savings from its net income per year. 
14
 We also run fixed-effect estimations. In this case, the saving rate is explained by an additional fixed effect 
term (𝑎𝑖). 
15
 While the panel includes the individual expectations of the household members, it only includes the overall 
savings of the household. Because of the household saving information, we calculate income-weighted 
household expectations. 
16
 Because the data regarding the value of a household’s real estate are only estimated by the owner, we use a 
dummy variable for real estate ownership. Nevertheless, estimations that use the documented value of the real 
estate do generate similar results. 
17
 The dummy variable for a bad health expectation is calculated analogously to how the good health expectation 
dummy is calculated. The coefficient of this variable becomes insignificant in the great majority of specifications 
(44 of 48), but in most cases, the sign corroborates the good health expectation dummy variable. 
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For example, a person in poor health may save less money, even if he has negative income 
expectations. Because opposing effects are possible, the Impact of health expectations on 
savings is a priori less clear. To the best of our knowledge, there is no matching theory, and 
there is only a small strand of the literature that studies the effect of health expectations on 
savings in micro-based data.
18
 
Finally, it is also possible that the income expectations affect savings made in distinct 
investment periods differently. For example, it is plausible that building loan contracts may 
not be reduced because of (short-term) income reduction (e.g., unemployment); in contrast, 
savings accounts’ balances may decrease. Hence, we estimate equation (1) for short-term, 
medium-term and long-term savings (see section 3, investment horizon 𝑗). It seems to be 
necessary to consider the period of savings because the expectations of the dataset have 
different temporal horizons. Thus, short-run expectations (such as the unemployment 
expectation) may only affect the short-term saving rate.
19
 
Mutual causality may pose a problem in our regressions, inasmuch as current savings affect 
the future income expectation. Because of that issue, we also use the expectations about the 
future employment situation; more precisely, we use the expected probability of becoming 
unemployed as an exogenous alternative for the income expectation. We employ this usage 
because the information about a household’s future income expectation in the dataset does not 
differentiate between labor and capital income. Higher savings may increase the future capital 
income and therefore the income expectation. The saving rate should not have an impact on 
                                                          
18
 The findings of recent studies indicate that wealth may be associated with better self-rated health [Pollack et 
al. (2007)]. Thus, we can assume that a better health expectation is equivalent to a better wealth expectation. 
However, it is still true that no clear hypothesis about the impact of the health expectation on wealth can be 
formulated. For example, Zhang and Zhang (2005) examine the effect of life expectancy on savings by using 
cross-sectional macroeconomic data. These authors show that a higher life expectancy induces higher savings. 
19
 Without any restrictions (e.g. saving contracts) a shock in the expectations should affect all savings, but many 
savings are bound by contracts. Therefore we differ between the temporal horizons of savings. 
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the probability and expectation of becoming unemployed. As a result, using the employment 
expectation will not induce mutual causality.  
We estimate the empirical model with a focus on the future employment and income 
expectations of the households in Eastern and Western Germany separately. The households, 
and especially the income structures, differ in the two parts of Germany. The female labor 
market participation, and therefore their share of a typical household’s net income, is much 
higher in Eastern Germany [Matysiak and Steinmetz (2008)]. Therefore, it may also be true 
that a household’s saving decision and its impacts differ for this reason.
20
 
We also estimate different specifications of equation (1) to avoid several problems that are 
common in panel regression estimations. First, we are interested in the variation over time, 
which induces the usage of a fixed-effect (FE) model. Nevertheless, we perform both FE and 
random effect (RE) estimations, and we will present both the RE and FE regression results in 
this paper. The Hausman-test suggests FE estimations for the majority of specifications. The 
use of robust estimators helps us avoid heteroscedasticity.  
Finally we estimate equation (2) with two different measures of the savings.
21
 We use two 
different methods to calculate the annual savings of the households, and the first one uses 
subjective amount of savings of each household. The households report their estimated sum of 
savings in the relevant period. Unfortunately, the household members often neglect dis-saving 
or liabilities when they estimate their savings. Furthermore, the households only estimate the 
sums of their savings, and the different types of investments are not accounted for separately 
(see section 2 for descriptions of short-term, medium-term and long-term savings). The 
                                                          
20
 A regression for Germany with a dummy variable representing Eastern Germany show significant differences 
(the dummy variable is mainly negative and significant). 
21
 Furthermore, we perform a GMM estimation [see Blundell and Bond (2000)], because it is possible that the 
saving rate of the last period affects the current saving rate. For the great majority of specifications (14 out of 
16), the saving rates of the previous period do not have a significant impact on the current saving rates. 
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second option is, to calculate the savings (flow) out of the change of the assets stocks between 
two periods. The advantage of this method is that it is more precisely and it includes dis-
saving and liabilities. Moreover, we can consider capital gains (of investments) which are not 
use for consumption. In the following sections, we present the results of both estimation 
strategies with respect to the different definitions of savings in separate specifications for 
Eastern and Western Germany. 
 
5.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, we determine whether we can find evidence for the IEH. More specifically, we 
determine whether an increasing labor income expectation (or a decreasing unemployment 
expectation) leads to decreased savings. First, we present the RE and FE results for the 
reported (estimated) savings of the households in Eastern and Western Germany. As 
mentioned above, the amount of saving is only an estimation that was made by the 
householders themselves. We can divide the savings into all savings and savings for future 
income (life insurance and building loan contracts are long-term savings).
22
 Table 16 
summarizes the estimation results for Western Germany, and Table 17 presents the equivalent 
results for Eastern Germany. 
                                                          
22
 The householders were ask (1) how much did they save the year and (2) how much do they save for e.g. life 
insurance or building loan contracts. 
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Table 16: The Regression Results for the Estimated Savings (Western Germany) 
 All Savings Savings for Future Income 
robust FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Households income 
expectation (IE) 
-0.0195 -0.0006   -0.0117 -0.0052   
(0.0171) (0.0110)   (0.0085) (0.0057)   
Households 
unemployment    -0.0019 0.0062   -0.0011 0.0006 
expectation (UE) 
  
(0.0089) (0.0058) 
  
(0.0050) (0.0027) 
Households health 
expectation  0.0758 0.0930 0.0249 0.0809 0.0812 0.0643 -0.0513 0.0279 
Good (HEG) (0.130) (0.0771) (0.0842) (0.0625) (0.0865) (0.0520) (0.0370) (0.0266) 
Hausman-test 0.40 0.04 0.06 0.01 
R
2
-within 0.5343 0.5336 0.2454 0.2427 0.5435 0.5431 0.1667 0.1646 
R
2
-between 0.2605 0.3244 0.0359 0.1962 0.2079 0.2300 0.0683 0.1569 
R
2
-overall 0.4860 0.5182 0.1348 0.2599 0.5004 0.5091 0.1354 0.1900 
Observations 8169 3742 9776 5349 
Controls 
heritages, wins etc. (income share); real estate ownership; age and age square (interviewee); children; skill level (interviewee); each year’s dummy 
variable; interaction terms (income/unemployment expectation and health expectation, as well as health situation and expectation) 
Source: the authors’ calculations. The significance-levels: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 
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Table 17: The Regression Results for the Estimated Savings (Eastern Germany) 
 All Savings Savings for Future Income 
robust FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Households income 
expectation (IE) 
0.00389 0.00541   -0.000495 -0.000257   
(0.00448) (0.00590)   (0.00205) (0.00155)   
Households 
unemployment    -0.0140** -0.00243   0.00259 0.000371 
expectation (UE) 
  
(0.00567) (0.00284) 
  
(0.00213) (0.00113) 
Households health 
expectation  -0.0803 -0.00881 0.0325 0.0305 -0.0306** -0.0126 -0.0147 0.00715 
Good (HEG) (0.0798) (0.0306) (0.0996) (0.0444) (0.0129) (0.0110) (0.0284) (0.0160) 
Hausman-test 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 
R
2
-within 0.1133 0.1082 0.3495 0.3350 0.0291 0.0260 0.1439 0.1340 
R
2
-between 0.4190 0.4968 0.8026 0.8453 0.0106 0.0366 0.0088 0.0276 
R
2
-overall 0.1545 0.1866 0.5484 0.5832 0.0158 0.0308 0.0267 0.0744 
Observations 3052 1257 3731 1936 
Controls 
heritages, wins etc. (income share); real estate ownership; age and age square (interviewee); children; skill level (interviewee); each year’s dummy 
variable; interaction terms (income/unemployment expectation and health expectation, as well as health situation and expectation) 
Source: the authors’ calculations. The significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 
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The results presented in Table 16 and Table 17 do not confirm the hypothesis of the model, 
which posited that people with decreasing income expectations would save more money. For 
Western Germany, we are unable to find significant results for the theoretical propositions 
when using the estimated real savings that were reported by the households. In fact, in 
Western Germany, we cannot uncover significant results. For Eastern Germany, we find only 
two significant estimators for the unemployment and health expectations. We find notably 
weak evidence that if Eastern German households have good future health expectations, they 
reduce their saving rates for the purposes of life insurance and building loan contracts. 
Furthermore, a higher unemployment expectation seems to decrease the saving rate. 
In general, the R
2
 of the regressions, and therefore their quality, is relatively high. 
Nevertheless, the results should be interpreted with caution. The reported values of the 
savings are estimations by the householders (the interviewees). To draw a more detailed 
picture, we will now present results for alternative specifications, that is, the results for the 
absolute changes in assets stocks between two periods. These values are based on the 
financial data of the households (i.e., the data that are not estimated by the householders 
themselves). Furthermore, the assets (savings) can be divided into short-, medium- and long-
term categories. In general, this specification should lead to more valuable results. Table 18 
and Table 19 summarize the regression results for Western Germany and Eastern Germany, 
respectively.
1
 
                                                          
1
 The skill level is excluded because it was insignificant under every specification. 
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Table 18: The Regression Results for Changes in Asset Stock = Savings (Western Germany) 
 All Savings Short Savings 
robust FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Households income 
expectation (IE) 
-0.102* -0.0981**   -0.0293 -0.0086   
(0.0559) (0.0481)   (0.0288) (0.0166)   
Households 
unemployment    -0.0618 -0.0174   -0.0339** -0.0200** 
expectation (UE) 
  
(0.0430) (0.0256) 
  
(0.0166) (0.0099) 
Marginal Effect 
Interaction UE x HGE 
  
  
  
-0.00002  
  
  
  
0.00014  
Households health 
expectation  0.662 0.211 1.479* 0.380 0.147 0.129 0.194 0.148 
Good (HEG) (0.832) (0.381) (0.821) (0.360) (0.190) (0.119) (0.258) (0.115) 
Marginal Effect 
Interaction Health 
  
1.3465  
  
  
situation x HGE 
  
(0.7225)  
  
  
Hausman-test 0.66 0.58 0.28 0.99 
R
2
-within 0.0500 0.0487 0.0065 0.0029 0.0832 0.0814 0.0079 0.0048 
R
2
-between 0.0173 0.0534 0.0000 0.0087 0.0285 0.0600 0.0001 0.0082 
R
2
-overall 0.0356 0.0532 0.0001 0.0048 0.0652 0.0811 0.0008 0.0065 
Observations 6859 3128 6859 3128 
Controls 
heritages, wins etc. (income share); real estate ownership; age and age square (interviewee); children; skill level (interviewee); each year’s dummy 
variable; interaction terms (income/unemployment expectation and health expectation, as well as health situation and expectation) 
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 Medium Savings Long Savings 
robust FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Households income 
expectation (IE) 
-0.0327 -0.0150   -0.0081 -0.0591   
(0.0206) (0.0114)   (0.0240) (0.0415)   
Households unemployment  
  
-0.0231 -0.0114 
  
0.0032 0.0189 
expectation (UE) 
  
(0.0147) (0.0130) 
  
(0.0361) (0.0242) 
Households health 
expectation  0.410* 0.186** 0.553 0.103 0.484 0.071 1.082 0.208 
Good (HEG) (0.244) (0.093) (0.655) (0.203) (0.795) (0.362) (0.704) (0.284) 
Marginal Effect 
Interaction Health 0.4778 
 
  
  
  
situation x HEG (0.5578) 
 
  
  
  
Hausman-test 0.67 0.19 0.75 0.50 
R
2
-within 0.0046 0.0031 0.0083 0.0030 0.0214 0.0202 0.0063 0.0023 
R
2
-between 0.0002 0.0062 0.0001 0.0072 0.0065 0.0208 0.0000 0.0073 
R
2
-overall 0.0000 0.0030 0.0003 0.0029 0.0128 0.0219 0.0003 0.0039 
Observations 6859 3128 6859 3128 
Controls 
heritages, wins etc. (income share); real estate ownership; age and age square (interviewee); children; skill level (interviewee); each year’s 
dummy variable; interaction terms (income/unemployment expectation and health expectation as well as health situation and expectation) 
Source: the authors’ calculations. The significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*).Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 
5 Expectations and Saving Behavior: An Empirical Analysis 
 
110 
 
As in the former setting (estimated savings), the impact of the expectation is not significant 
when we use the changes in assets stock (=savings). We are not able to confirm the IEH. 
Nevertheless, in Western Germany, we find a significant impact of the expectation variables 
when we use these different settings. A possible explanation for these results may be the more 
precise data about the net savings. In every setting, the Hausman-test recommends the use of 
the RE estimations.  
For Western Germany, the results for the income and unemployment expectations are 
ambiguous (see Table 18). The estimation that uses the income expectation to explain the 
overall saving rate seems to confirm the IEH. We find evidence that an increasing income 
expectation decreases the savings (i.e., the saving rate). If the household expects a higher 
income (1%), the saving rate decreases by approximately 0.10 percentage points (pp) (Table 
18, column 3). However, the regression in which mutual causality is excluded does not 
confirm this finding. Western German households decrease their short-term saving rate by 
about -0.03 pp if they expect a higher probability (1%) of becoming unemployed (also equal 
to a lower income expectation) (Table 18, column 9). This result is in contrast to the 
expectations of the simple IEH. If we consider the interaction between the unemployment and 
health expectations, the marginal effect becomes insignificant. Thus, the unemployment 
expectation does not affect the short-term saving rate of a household with a good health 
expectation, but this expectation does affect a household with a normal health expectation (-
0.03 pp).
1
 
Two possible reasons may explain the different results that were obtained for the income and 
unemployment expectations. First, the use of the income expectation may induce mutual 
causality (see section 4). Second, German labor market legislation may affect the saving 
                                                          
1
 The interaction’s effect is shown graphically in the Appendix (Figure 19). The marginal effects were only 
calculated for the specification that the Hausman-test suggests. 
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decision. If a person becomes unemployed, he has to liquidate his savings (in particular, short-
term savings and long-term savings are secured by the legislation) down to a personal 
allowance before he can request unemployment benefits. Thus, the negative effect may result 
from this labor market legislation. If householders expect unemployment, they may dis-save 
their short term savings.
2
 
The medium and long-term saving rates are not affected by the income and unemployment 
expectations. This phenomenon is also observed in Eastern Germany (see Table 19). We can 
provide two explanations for these findings. First, the dataset contains the income and 
unemployment expectations for one year, which makes them “short-term” expectations. 
Medium- and long-term savings are often bound by contracts. Thus a variation of this savings 
often needs time and money. It is much easier to adapt short-term savings like savings 
accounts. Second, the German labor market legislation secures long-term savings if someone 
becomes unemployed. Thus, (short-term) unemployment does not endanger (old-age) income 
by forcing the liquidation of private savings.
3
 Both facts provide a plausible explanation for 
the reaction of only the short-term saving rate. 
We will now take an additional look at the health expectation and the health situation in 
Western Germany. We find weak evidence that a good health expectation increases the 
medium-term saving rate (+0.17 to +0.41 pp) of households. If we consider the current health 
situation, the impact always becomes insignificant (see Figure 20 in the Appendix). 
                                                          
2
 Engen and Gruber (2001) and Hubbard et al. (1994) find a similar effect by using proxies for the probability of 
unemployment (instead of the individual unemployment expectation). 
3
 In the case of long-term unemployment private savings reduce the claim of benefit, but there is also an amount 
of exemption for savings (especially for pension plans). 
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Table 19: The Regression Results for Changes in Asset Stock = Savings (Eastern Germany) 
 All Savings Short Savings 
robust FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Households income 
expectation (IE) 
0.0879 0.0559   0.0166 0.00847   
(0.0714) (0.0483)   (0.0218) (0.0126)   
Households unemployment  
  
0.148 0.0307 
  
0.0657 0.0231 
expectation (UE) 
  
(0.186) (0.0797) 
  
(0.0632) (0.0235) 
Households health 
expectation  -0.739 0.0361 -1.930* -1.234** -0.286** -0.151 -0.161 -0.0911 
Good (HEG) (0.679) (0.521) (1.080) (0.557) (0.141) (0.109) (0.206) (0.105) 
Marginal Effect 
Interaction Health 
  
-1.6608  
  
  
situation x HGE 
  
(0.9581)  
  
  
Hausman-test 0.55 0.09 0.96 0.73 
R
2
-within 0.0063 0.0029 0.0436 0.0329 0.0054 0.0036 0.0167 0.0104 
R
2
-between 0.0005 0.0001 0.0000 0.0284 0.0001 0.0128 0.0235 0.0504 
R
2
-overall 0.0002 0.0018 0.0129 0.0278 0.0012 0.0044 0.0072 0.0137 
Observations 2726 1109 2726 1109 
Controls 
heritages, wins etc. (income share); real estate ownership; age and age square (interviewee); children; skill level (interviewee); each year’s 
dummy variable; interaction terms (income/unemployment expectation and health expectation, as well as health situation and expectation) 
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 Medium Savings Long Savings 
robust FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Households income 
expectation (IE) 
0.0314 0.0049   0.0454 0.0353   
(0.0593) (0.0216)   (0.0575) (0.0433)   
Households unemployment  
  
-0.0163 0.0036 
  
-0.0289 -0.0471 
expectation (UE) 
  
(0.0334) (0.0153) 
  
(0.0671) (0.0524) 
Households health 
expectation  0.466 0.748 0.172 0.0815 -0.769 -0.319* -1.497 -1.105** 
Good (HEG) (0.463) (0.705) (0.145) (0.0703) (0.483) (0.188) (0.977) (0.535) 
Hausman-test 0.99 0.59 0.40 0.99 
R
2
-within 0.0021 0.0012 0.0187 0.0097 0.0110 0.0079 0.0079 0.0052 
R
2
-between 0.0005 0.0242 0.0045 0.0203 0.0001 0.0057 0.0029 0.0332 
R
2
-overall 0.0006 0.0079 0.0010 0.0110 0.0008 0.0071 0.0012 0.0115 
Observations 2726 1109 2726 1109 
Controls 
heritages, wins etc. (income share); real estate ownership; age and age square (interviewee); children; skill level (interviewee); each year’s 
dummy variable; interaction terms (income/unemployment expectation and health expectation as well as health situation and expectation) 
Source: the authors’ calculations. The significance-level: 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.1(*). Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. 
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The results obtained in Eastern Germany are different from the results in Western Germany 
(see Table 19). Again, we focus on the FE estimations for all specifications. In Eastern 
Germany, we could not find any impact of short-term expectations on the saving rates. With 
respect to the long-term health expectation, we find a significant negative impact of a good 
health expectation on the overall saving rate in Eastern Germany. In contrast to Western 
Germany, Eastern German households with a good health expectation have a 1.3 to 1.9 pp 
lower saving rate than households with an average health expectation, but this effect becomes 
insignificant if we consider the health situation.
1
 
If we compare the results of Table 16 and Table 18 (respectively, Table 17 and Table 19), we 
see that regressions of the first approach (Table 16 and Table 17) have a much greater 
explanatory power (R
2
) but less significant coefficients. The critical interpretation of both 
settings leads to the following result: we cannot confirm the IEH from the textbook model if 
we consider all of the results. In contrast to the IEH, we find evidence that Western German 
households reduce their short-term saving rates if they expect lower incomes as a result of 
potentially becoming unemployed.
2
 The crowding out of private savings because of social 
benefits may be responsible for this. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter analyzes the impact of certain expectations on the saving behavior of 
households. In contrast to former studies, we use panel data that was collected from German 
households, which contain information concerning the surveyed individuals’ income 
expectations, as well as detailed information regarding these individuals’ savings. We develop 
                                                          
1
 See the Appendix (Figure 21). 
2
 In Eastern Germany, we do not observe any significant impact of the income or unemployment expectations on 
the saving rates. The health expectation has different impacts in Eastern and Western Germany, but it becomes 
insignificant if we consider the interaction with the health situation. 
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an income expectation hypothesis that is based on the textbook model, whereupon a certain 
lower future mean income (expectation) should always increase households’ savings. By 
examining the impact of individual income and unemployment expectations on savings, we 
find evidence in Western Germany that a lower income expectation increases the overall 
saving rate. This result cannot be confirmed using the unemployment expectation, which 
would be necessary to exclude mutual causality. If we use the unemployment expectation, we 
find that an increasing unemployment expectation, which is equivalent to a lower income 
expectation, decreases the short-term saving rate in Western Germany for households with an 
average health expectation. Thus, our results are in line with the mixed evidence of the studies 
on this topic [Jappelli and Pistaferri (2000)]. German legislation concerning the labor market 
is a possible reason for the results in Western Germany.
3
 The unemployed have to liquidate 
their short-term savings down to a given level before they can apply for unemployment 
benefits. Hence, our result partly supports the findings of Engen and Gruber (2001), as well as 
Hubbard et al. (1994). Both papers find a negative impact of social security systems on 
savings. In contrast to these studies, we use individuals’ expectations regarding their future 
income and unemployment probabilities. Nevertheless, our results corroborate theirs. 
Our analysis shows evidence that the individual short-term unemployment expectation affects 
short-term savings. Furthermore, we cannot find evidence that if we consider the health 
situation, medium-term and long-term health expectations have a significant impact on the 
medium-term and long-term saving rates of German households. Both expectations can distort 
the saving decision. Thus, exogenous shocks in either the labor market (expectations) or in the 
health (expectations) may affect the savings rates and therefore capital markets and 
investments. As a consequence, social security systems can avoid contagion effects. For 
                                                          
3
 Lusardi (1997) points out, that “the existence of institutions (…) which potentially allow households to insure 
against income risk (…) should not be overlooked. The mere existence of these institutions can provide evidence 
per se that it is very important to avoid income risk” [Lusardi (1997) p. 325].  
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example, if a society prefers flexible labor markets, (relatively) high short-term 
unemployment benefits (e.g., Denmark) can increase the (labor) income expectation and 
therefore its impact on savings. The same finding is observed for the health care system, 
which may reduce uncertainty about future health.
4
  
Future theoretical research may answer the question of how health expectations affect savings 
decision. Moreover, it is still unclear if the impact of income expectations on savings behavior 
depends on the social security system. First, empirical studies find evidence that social 
security systems have a strong negative effect on private savings [see Alessie et al. (2012)]. 
All of the theoretical and empirical studies focus on the effect of a change in the future mean 
income (e.g., due to unemployment) on savings with respect to taxes and transfer systems, but 
the impact of income risk (in the sense of income variance) is both empirically and 
theoretically unclear.
5
  
  
                                                          
4
 Former studies show that “the introduction of social health insurance can substantially reduce uncertainty about 
out-of-pocket health expenditures, and thus reduce households’ precautionary-saving motive (…) and increased 
their consumption when the comprehensive health insurance became available” [Chou et al. (2003) p 1 892]. 
5
 Arent et al. (2012) discuss the effects of taxes and transfers on the impact that labor income risk has on savings.  
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5.9 Appendix 
Figure 19: Marginal Effect of the Unemployment Expectation on the Short-term Saving Rate, Considering 
Health Expectation (Western Germany) 
Source: authors’ calculations. CI=95% confidence interval. The coefficient is always negative and significant. 
Figure 20: Marginal Effect of the Health Expectation on the Medium-term Saving Rate, Considering 
Health Situation (Western Germany) 
Source: authors’ calculations. CI=95% confidence interval. 
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Figure 21: Marginal Effect of the Health Expectation on the Medium-term Saving Rate, Considering 
Health Situation (Eastern Germany) 
Source: authors’ calculations. CI=95% confidence interval. 
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